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ABSTRACT
An increase in the number of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has increased the
attention on cross-border challenges, such as transfer price manipulation (TPM). TPM is
a development issue - it undermines institutions as well as siphons money from
government revenues that could be directed towards programs for human development.
Pervasive corruption in the natural resource sector supports an environment where TPM
can flourish. This paper develops a strategy for combating TPM within the countries of
the Southern African Customs Union. It does this by 1) defining the terrain of illicit
flows, both generally and specifically to the abuse of transfer pricing through TPM, as
well as the nature of corruption in the natural resources sector; 2) exploring the role of
private actors by examining global trends in transfer pricing, as well generalizing trends
by public actors from recent actions taken by governments of developing countries; 3)
exploring the extent of MNE involvement in the natural resources sector within the
SACU region, as well as the specific legislation surrounding the sector; and lastly, 4)
developing a strategy based on international norms and standards. A fully accurate
assessment of TPM is unavailable because of a limited amount of data. Through proxy
analysis, this paper finds that the transfer pricing and mineral legislation of the SACU
region fails to regulate TPM adequately. Developing a coordinated strategy based off
international standards, with the SACU institution and its members as the primary
drivers, is the best step towards limiting the abuse.
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Section One: Introduction
Transfer pricing is an often-used mechanism in multinational enterprises (MNEs)
engaging in intrafirm trade1. Abuse of this common business practice occurs when the
misinvoicing of transfer prices is a motivated action. As cross-border economic activity
has increased, so has the amount of transfer pricing between subsidiaries and the parent
company of MNEs. The standard practice of transfer pricing is increasingly placed in a
complex environment because goods involved in the MNE production process are often
traded across countries that have unique tax arrangements, as well as different
capabilities to actually enforce laws. In developing countries, there remains a lack of
adequate and complementary laws to regulate transfer pricing, perhaps making the
environment for abusive pricing through transfer price manipulation (TPM) easier. While
the challenges of TPM spans across all sectors, it can be particularly problematic in the
extraction of natural resources, which can often be a haven for corruption and other illicit
activity. For these reasons, developing countries rich in natural resources, such as those
of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), should confront this issue seriously.
Currently there lacks a clear and coordinated strategy within the SACU region to address
neither TPM nor transparency in the natural resource sector.

1

Lorraine Eden (2012) defines intrafirm trade as “trade [that] occurs between related
parties (that is, between affiliated units of an MNE)” (et. al., 2012, p. 206). Italics and
brackets added.
1

One of the main challenges in assessing TPM is the lack of accurate data. This is
likely due to three interconnected constraints: the clandestine nature of the flow itself; the
relatively recent attention this issue has gained; and the fact that accounting capacity in
developing countries tends to be less sophisticated and widespread as in those that are
more developed. Despite the lack of data, this paper shows that a unique and relevant
analysis is certainly possible. To accomplish this, it synthesizes the work of a number of
independent studies and surveys, analyzes appropriate legislation from SACU and its
member countries, and considers international guidelines to both regulate transfer pricing
and promote transparency in the natural resource sector. First, this paper reviews illicit
flows in-depth. Oftentimes, and particularly in the SACU countries, transfer pricing
legislation is limited or non-existent, meaning that its abuse does not fall strictly into a
traditional definition of “illicitness.” This must be understood in its complexity, including
a dimension of legal (or perhaps not yet illegal) flows that are detrimental to economic
and human development. After clarifying illicit behavior, this paper reviews the literature
on how illicit behavior undermines institution building, which also impacts development.
The scope of illicit flows is further narrowed to include a review of the corrupt
environment that tends to surround the natural resource sector, which most SACU
country economies heavily depend on. The literature review concludes by reviewing
transfer pricing, and how its abuse, TPM, fits into the overall discussion of illicit flows.
TPM presents a challenge for development, though it is hard to capture the entire
extent of the issue because the illicit activity is, by nature, hard to calculate. Estimates put
the figures in the billions of potential government revenue lost. These are not small
numbers for SACU countries that face significant hurdles in development. Equally
2

alarming is that private companies, as evidenced by the Ernst & Young 2010 Global
Transfer Pricing Survey, are increasingly using transfer pricing, and are keenly aware of
importance in business strategies. This research, along with investigation into the location
of the parent company (owners) of extractive natural resource companies in the SACU
region, points to the likelihood that TPM is a growing problem in the region. Using the
existing SACU framework, OECD guidelines for transfer pricing, and Compliance rules
under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); a strategy to effectively
tackle this form of tax evasion is possible.
Because of the dearth in data on transfer pricing, this paper seeks to analyze the
issues through as much proxy material as possible. The methodology is to build a logical
picture from all of this fragmented information and research to frame the environment for
TPM to flourish in a region rich in natural resources. Using the United States Geological
Survey (USGS), the paper explores the size and characteristics of the natural resource
sector in each SACU member country, including the extent of MNE involvement. This
paper also builds upon USGS work by investigating the individual mines themselves, and
documenting where parent companies are headquartered. This characterizes the complex
environment that MNEs operate (e.g. tax jurisdictions), and helps to map the points at
which TPM may occur. An analysis of the strength of legal mechanisms to handle TPM
through examinations of the pertinent legislation for each country, and the SACU
framework itself, is also included in these country profiles. Then, it explores trends in
transfer pricing in the private sector. Using the Global Transfer Pricing Survey from the
international accounting firm Ernst & Young, current trends in transfer pricing point to its
rise in use as a business mechanism in intrafirm trade, but also a rise in the concerns
3

involving documentation and litigation of potential abuses. Complicating the illicit flow
of finances through mechanisms like TPM is the position that auditors take in the
process. Experts surveyed auditors in a number of African countries and found that there
is often misunderstanding of the auditing role and presence of illicit activity in daily
business operations, further complicating the environment.
This paper arrives at the hypothesis that the SACU region is particularly
vulnerable to TPM. This being said, it is important to develop a strategy for the region to
address these illicit flows. This involves reform within individual countries, but also a
coordinated attempt to improve the SACU framework itself. The strategy is multipronged in the fact that it encompasses guidelines based off of international norms and
standards for transfer pricing from the Organization for Economic Development and
Cooperation (OECD), as well as coupling this with rules from the internationally
recognized Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
The paper is organized as followed. This section concludes with a brief
conceptualization of the problem. Section 2 is a literature review of illicit financial flows.
It begins by conceptualizing illicit flows, providing a unique and comprehensive
definition for “illicit” that expands beyond simply illegality. Then, it reviews the
perceived effects of illicit flows on development, and explores the problematic
relationship between private actors and natural resource extraction in creating an
environment for illicit activity to flourish. Lastly, it uses the previous review to integrate
the issue of TPM. Section 3 reviews trends in transfer pricing, as well as the available
evidence of TPM. Following this, it provides a political-economic analysis of the
potential consequences of increased regulation. Section 4 provides country profiles for
4

the SACU region. It analyzes the environment of natural resource extraction, the extent
of MNE involvement, as well as tax laws surrounding the sector. It provides a unique
database of subsidiary and parent company location to characterize the extent of MNE
involvement. It also analyzes the strength of the legal framework of SACU and its
member countries to face TPM. Section 5 integrates the use of international standards,
from the OECD and EITI, to frame policy as a way forward. Section 6 overviews some
potentially significant future challenges and briefly concludes the paper.
The Problem
The current period of globalization has witnessed an increase in cross-border
economic activities. Neo-liberalism has, more or less, flourished as global and regional
integration has spurred new cross-border arrangements in the forms of free trade
agreements, customs unions, finance arrangements, and even conditional aid-fordevelopment policies. One phenomenon, which both drives and is driven by
globalization, is the growth in the number of multi-national enterprises (MNEs). MNEs
are defined as private entities that simultaneously operate in more than one country at a
given time- a result of the “gone global” nature of the production process. The rise in the
number of MNEs has also coincided with a rise in the number of foreign subsidiaries.
According to the World Investment Report 2011, there are just over 100, 000 MNE
“parent corporations,” or majority owner corporations, and nearly 900,000 foreign
subsidiaries. This is considerably more than the 35,000 parent corporations and 150,000
foreign subsidiaries in 1990 (1992 World Investment Report). These numbers reflect the
growth economic integration that is the defining characteristic of globalization.

5

However, integration within politics and decision-making has not followed the
same trajectory as economies have. Though the number of bi-lateral and multi-lateral
organizations has indeed grown, cooperation often faces the issue of sovereignty.
Governments are constrained by the will of those who legitimize their political authority,
whether it is through the politics of fear, the vote, or some combination of the two.
Creating consensus and majorities is often difficult; coordinating decision-making
between countries amplifies this. On the other hand, private economic actors, such as
MNEs, are more constrained by the marketplace and regulation, the latter of which has
been challenged by the proliferation of neo-liberalism in globalization. In this
environment of economic integration, private actors have more flexibility compared to
political actors, especially when the political climate becomes difficult. Thus, the
economic effects of globalization have produced conflicting results; through
globalization, private actors are left with fewer checks, while public actors have been
confronted with more.
This paper focuses on, TPM, one of the many challenges faced by the growth of
MNEs. TPM is the misinvoicing of transfer prices in intrafirm trade. It tends to be a
decision made by firms to avoid government regulations, such as taxation, or to take
advantage others, such as export subsidies. It is easier for MNEs to engage in this
behavior in developing countries, which are often home to foreign affiliates, because they
either lack adequate policies on transfer pricing, or don’t have the capacity to enforce
laws that are present. Furthermore, transfer pricing has only recently received more
global attention, so available data on the extent of the tax revenues lost are limited. This
paper views TPM as a serious issue. Different actors are accountable. By avoiding taxes,
6

private firms are circumventing the legitimacy of tax institutions. This can pose a serious
problem for the public sector in poorer countries that tend to have less developed tax
institutions, because tax systems should be able to collect revenue to supplement fiscal
policies that can support a development policy. Though, private actors that are abusing
transfer prices are not always completely at fault, corruption in the public sector can
provide the ideal environment for this illicit flow to flourish. In this way, sometimes
governments can be their own worst enemies. The interaction between the public and
private sectors, though, can truly serve development. Literature shows that legitimate tax
systems are largely seen as a precursor to democracy and creating legitimacy for the
government as a whole. A well functioning government can support an environment for
private firms to grow.
The scope of this paper is the countries of the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU): Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Initially signed in
1910 and revised following decolonization and independence, SACU is considered the
world’s oldest customs union. This scope gives a good analysis of the challenge of TPM
because it represents a group of countries that have experienced relatively similar
histories, face similar problems, but allows flexibility for marked differences in economic
development and governance capabilities. A narrow scope within this region is the
natural resource sector. The extraction of natural resources is often associated with
corruption and illicit activity, transfer pricing is likely one of them. All SACU countries
are integrated within the global extractive natural resource web and are home to
subsidiaries whose parent companies are found in well-developed economies in North
America, Europe and Asia. This exposes them to the abuse of TPM.
7

One challenge faced by this paper is the inability to gain substantial data on
transfer pricing within these countries. The reality is that the United States is one of the
only countries that report data for intrafirm trade, although the OECD has been working
towards collecting this for its member countries. Compounding this difficulty is the fact
that, given the clandestine nature of TPM, it is unlikely that purely accurate data will be
available in the future. Regardless of these challenges, a skillful analysis is still possible.
SACU provides documents on laws regarding customs relations between member
countries, each country also has adequate information regarding their individual tax
policies, and a plethora of literature exists assessing institutional development and
taxation.
Mapping the Terrain
This introduction accurately demonstrates the complexity of TPM. Below, Figure
1 depicts a simple logical framework of intrafirm trade in the natural resource sector.
Figure 1: Concept Map for Intrafirm Trade2

!"#$%&'"()$%*+&,(
-./(0%&1#21'+1$*(

9+:"&(;%6#121.&1"#(
-./(0%&1#21'+1$*(

3!41*1*5(
#%6#121.&,(
"/+&.'+#(&"#$%&'"(

7$$2#(-&.*#8"&&"2(

2

3!<.&1$%#(
$="&.+1$*#(
2"="*21*5($*(
=&$2%'+1$*(
=&$'"##(
7$$2#(-&.*#8"&&"2(

>.&"*+()$?=.*,(
-./(0%&1#21'+1$*(
3!@*A"#+?"*+B(
$C*"&#:1=(.*2(
?.*.5"?"*+($8(
#%6#121.&1"#B(.*2(
$+:"&(A.&1$%#(
6%#1*"##(
$="&.+1$*#D(

For further simplicity, this concept map generalizes the extent of additional subsidiaries
in the production process. While they often exist, this paper does not focus on the specific
operations of subsidiaries. This varies depending on the type of resource extracted. As
more data on transfer pricing, as well as methods to measure transfer price manipulation,
is gathered, this can supplement such research.
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Mining subsidiaries extract a resource then sell it to the next company in the production
chain, and so on. These other subsidiaries are involved in a number of different
operations depending on the type of resource extracted; for example, this may be a
factory specializing in cutting and polishing diamonds, refining for coal, or smelting for
iron-ore. Though, all subsidiaries share the characteristic of being wholly owned and
managed by parent companies. As goods move along the value-chain, it enters different
tax jurisdictions, requiring a transfer price of the good. Oftentimes, these jurisdictions
lack complementary tax laws, meaning that companies may have additional cost burdens
when transferring into jurisdictions with higher tax rates. The complexity of TPM occurs
at the points where customs duties are collected. It is defined as the “over- or underinvoicing of transfer prices by MNEs” (Eden, 2012, p. 206). Inadequate laws regulating
the natural resource sector and transfer pricing in the SACU region may allow MNEs to
circumvent regulation. In corrupt environments, particularly those in the natural resource
sector, public officials (e.g. customs officials) may allow the abuse of transfer prices in
return for bribes and kickbacks; in collusion, private actors in MNEs may engage in
abusing transfer pricing in order to decrease costs and increase profits. Regardless of who
is responsible for TPM, which requires a microscopic view of each action taken, it is
often development that suffers. This paper will explore the issues outlined and
conceptualized in this introduction, in order to suggest a framework for action.

.
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Section Two: Illicit Financial Flows
There is an ample amount of literature surrounding illicit financial flows. Much
of the attention is given to more “traditional” illicit flows such as human and drug
trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering. Only recently has the literature on
transfer price manipulation begun to expand. Availability and accuracy of data,
compounded with the clandestine nature of the illicit flows themselves, remains a serious
problem in analyses of this issue. However, some researchers have developed
methodologies to capture as much data as possible, as well as create estimates. According
to a Global Financial Integrity (Kar & Cartwright Smith, 2008) report, illicit financial
flows through Africa totaled about $854 billion, but due to the measuring constraints, the
total is more likely near $1.8 trillion. To put this in perspective, if the true figure is closer
to the latter number, illicit financial flows into and out of the continent represent the size
of the 2005 GDP of all African countries combined (World Bank). Following their
analyses, the authors suspect that commercial tax evasion (TPM being one type) accounts
for about 60 – 65% of the conservative estimate. From a developmentalist point of view,
the question must be asked: where would these flows have otherwise gone? Of course, it
is unlikely that all of this money would be directed towards a developmental purpose, but
increasing government revenues is important for creating sound governance institutions,
which can then support a larger developmental structure. First, this discussion requires a
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definition of “illicit” because the term is often hastily used but rarely understood. Then,
we can analyze how this impacts development.
Illicitness, (Il)Legality, and Immorality
Illicitness is typically defined as unlawfulness. While this is not incorrect, it is
simplistic and should be understand in a more nuanced way. In fact, there are many
negative actions that are either legal, or simply left undefined in law. For example, the
billions of US dollars that were packaged into confusing derivatives and other various
financial instruments were legal, for the most part, but they brought the global economy
to a halt, as there was little liquid capital to back up bad assets. This resulted in the worst
economic downturn since the Great Depression. One can ascertain the legality of these
transactions, but it may be difficult to argue in favor of them given the hardship they
created for much of society. Regardless of their legal standing, these actions are generally
considered “wrong.” The following literature review examines some of the nuances
involved in defining illicitness. This will provide the foundation for framing transfer
price manipulation as an impediment to development.
The most common and agreed upon description of illicit financial flows involves
those that are explicitly related to the exploitation and abuse of humans, such as human
trafficking in the sex trade or child soldiers; those that involve general abuse of global
social norms related to moral issues in the trafficking of drugs and arms; or those
traditionally associated with common financial norms like commercial tax evasion,
money laundering and racketeering. Prescriptively, “illicit financial flows may then be
defined as any capital transaction that intentionally moves capital unrecordedly out of a
country” (Nitsch, 2011). In other words, illicit flows are clandestine and motivated
11

actions to remain hidden from authority. However, Max Everest-Phillips (2012) argues
that there are different forms of illicit financial behavior beyond traditionally recognized
activities. To frame his argument he relies on the premise that perceptions of illicit
behavior are rooted in illegitimacy. They certainly include any activity that is illegal as in
the Nitsch definition above, but also include anything that is “immoral in undermining
the state’s willingness and capacity to deliver better lives for its citizens” (et. al., 2012,
pp. 70 - 71). This is based on the notion that a capable and legitimate state is needed to
direct development, growth and security. While most can agree on the definition of
traditional forms of illicit flows, should these “immoral flows” be included? Working
from the Everest-Phillips definition, and applying it to an issue like capital flight (a
reaction to both political and economic environments), requires delineation. The author
argues that “flight indicates exit from risk; flow is simply a movement of liquid financial
assets” (et. al., 2012, p. 71). Illegal capital flight is an unlawful, yet rational movement of
assets; legal capital flight is lawful and rational. On the flow side, illegal capital flows
can be described in the way above- a movement of assets to hide from authority, and
legal capital flows are simply lawful movements of assets. The problematic position that
the author takes in describing these four dimensions of capital movement is that his legal
definition takes a humanistic point of view; the use of the word “immoral” is certainly a
testament to this. Legality can be further delineated to include movements that occur
outside the confines of any codified law, or, potentially immoral/illicit behavior. In this
sense, legal or undefined capital flight should be considered illicit. Here, the author
primarily focuses on institution building through effective taxation. Capable and
legitimate tax institutions are important for state building because they
12

“reflect the intrinsic legitimacy of the state (based on
consent, manifested among taxpayers as tax morale, their
inherent willingness to pay taxes) and funds the
effectiveness of state institutions (manifested in actual
compliance)” (Everest-Phillips, 2012).
The author argues that there is an explicit link between weak institutions and illicit flows.
He explores tax evasion in Latin America and finds that Argentina and Mexico, who have
not taken as serious of steps as Chile to combat the activity, experience higher rates of it.
Although a serious analysis of the public domain for illicit activity to flourish, EverestPhillips presents a fairly narrow scope, going as far as to say that “politics and
institutions, not geography or economic structure, drive rates of capital flight” (et. al.,
2012, p. 72). This statement is alarming because, first, institutions affect both the
development of political, economic and social structures within countries, and secondly,
capital has a preference for the market, which is informed by institutional arrangements,
and will likely move where it can be the most productive and efficient.
Stephanie Blankenburg and Mushtaq Kahn (2012) claim that illicit flows have
flourished in an integrated, yet “opaque” international financial system. Like Max
Everest-Phillips, they also define illicitness in a nuanced way, describing
“an illicit financial flow… [as] one that has an overall
negative effect on economic growth, taking into account
both direct and indirect effects in the context of the specific
political settlement of a country” (et. al., 2012, p. 23).
They separate the types of illicit flows to the following:
•

Portfolio choice follows from a neo-liberal standpoint of profit maximization,
utility and rational choice. That is, firms will move capital from environments that
promise less after-tax returns to those that promise more. Calculations of risk are
motivated by structural uncertainty, meaning that private actors are more apt to
move capital to relatively stable and well-developed markets than those in more
volatile areas.
13

•

Escape from Social Controls is not dramatically different from the portfolio
approach. While the first approach assumes capital movement due to structural
irregularities, this one focuses on the social contract of the country. Capital moves
where it is less likely to be usurped by the social controls present.

•

Dirty Money has a fairly simple definition and refers to any movement of capital
that involves illegal and abusive activities.

Traditional illicit flows follow from the dirty money approach, but the other two
dimensions are most pertinent for abusive financial operations like TPM. Unique to their
definition is the presence of the social contract. In so doing, illicitness must account for
the political settlement, defined as the “reproducible structure of formal and informal
institutions with an associated distribution of benefits that reflects a sustainable
distribution of power” (et. al., 2012, p. 23). From this context, regardless of the types and
extent of regulations, the flow of finance is bound by a broader legal framework as well
as the larger, and maybe even informal at times, consent of society. Manipulations of
legal frameworks, which are often the case in developing countries that have weak or
non-existent legal mechanisms (e.g. towards transfer pricing), are included in this. This
can become problematic, though, in countries that are governed institutionally by
different sets of “rules-of-the-game.” Kahn (2010) explains that developed countries,
through the evolution of judicial processes, had the time and capability to set up formal
arrangements, but developing countries are often governed implicitly through informal
arrangements. Even so, different sets of formality and informality exist on a country-bycountry level. In reality, “because the construction of political settlements [or social
orders] differs significantly across societies, the economic and political effects of
particular financial flows are also likely to be different” (Blankenburg et. al., 2012, p.
14

26). When defining something as illicit, it becomes clear that different types of
economies are prone to certain types of “illicitness” than others. For example, developed
countries are not likely to be prone to the same scope of dirty money as others. This does
not mean that it is not regarded as a problem, though. As is well known, illicit markets
exist in some capacity across all levels of development, e.g. drug trafficking to the US, a
highly developed economy, is driven by demand for illegal drugs, while source and
transit countries in Latin America, which are not as developed, are driven by supply.
Unique political, economic, and social environments guide every step along the path of
the flow. This realization is particularly important for this sort of analysis because
making broad generalizations can be dangerous.
Despite its inclusion of what is not always defined by law, defining illicitness
must include legalistic argument. For a legal positivist, simply defining illicitness based
on morality can be problematic for proper judicial processes because it is far too nuanced.
In this sense, it can disrupt the importance of precedent setting. For simplicity purposes,
this paper considers two aspects of legal theory, first, that laws should be defined
normatively, and the second that we exist in a world of legal pluralism. Ralf Michaels
(2009) outlines legal pluralism in the new global context saying it has flourished as a
result of “the plurality of legal orders, the decentralized position of the state, [and] the
strengthening of non-state norms” (et. al., 2009, pp. 21-22). He is candid by the fact that
normative interpretations of law are vulnerable to the very existence of this legal state,
because the legal apparatus itself hasn’t caught up to its new environment. In a sense,
legality is scrambling to find its place, which is likely to continue to be problematic as the
outcomes of globalization are complex and, at times, even surprising. Regardless of these
15

problems, though, the judicial process must continue; it is prudent to account for
complexity and nuances. In a lecture on international and comparative law in 2009,
William Twining (2009) goes further and weds the ideas of normative viewpoints on law
with legal pluralism, arguing that they have always coexisted; globalization has just
finally brought them into the forefront of discussion. He draws on a body of legal,
anthropological and sociological literature, concluding that
“…mildly positivistic demographic realism in mapping
legal phenomena in the world is only useful up to a pointin sketching a broad context for more specific inquiries. For
this kind of purpose it is helpful to treat legal pluralism as a
species of normative pluralism to be sensitive to problems
of individuation (of norms, normative orders, and legal
traditions)” (Twining, 2009, p. 514).
Even from a technical point-of-view it is important to account for legal pluralism because
developing countries often lack the same judicial capacity as developed ones. This is also
pertinent when exploring cross-border transactions involving MNEs in jurisdictions with
different levels of development, because the terrain between businesses operating in
different jurisdictions can be quite opaque.
From this literature review we can see that definitions of illicit are more nuanced
than one may think. Of course, they still include the traditional types such as dirty money,
but they may also include what is immoral, and also what violates a social contract.
These are things that may or may not be adjudicated through a legal process. Even if the
above arguments remain unconvincing, one can still follow the logic. From a teleological
perspective, social norms have accounted for types of traditionally illicit behavior
because they come from somewhere: the purpose to know what are considered “good”
and what are “bad” practices. Exploitation of humans, promoting violence, and engaging
16

in financial fraud like commercial tax evasion are generally considered “bad” because
they produce negative results. However, realizing that humans have limits, and that often
adjudicating right and wrong lags behind what is actually right and wrong, there is
definitely more to the world that is illicit. In trying to understand the subject of this paper,
transfer price manipulation, we will need to move beyond simplistic definitions.
Illicit Financial Flows and Development
As mentioned in the introduction to this work, Global Financial Integrity (Kar &
Cartwright-Smith, 2008) indicates that there has been $854 billion in illicit flows into and
out of Africa, but given the data constraints, the number is more likely near $1.8 trillion.
Ndikuma and Boyce (2008) even argue that, if economies account for illicit flows coming
from Africa, the world’s poorest continent can also be considered a net global creditor.
One point-of-view argues this money could be spent to address pertinent development
issues, such as education, health, and infrastructure. The effect, however, is much larger
than this; illicit flows undermine the legitimacy of the state and institution building,
which often provide the basis for a developmental structure. Having framed a more
nuanced meaning of illicitness, this literature review continues by exploring the
interaction between illicit movement of capital and its affects on institutions.
Institutions play an important role in development. In the 20th century, a culture of
neo-liberalism pervaded economic circles as policymakers called for liberalization and
deregulation. Today, neo-liberalism is still a valid viewpoint, but given the damage
deregulation proved to do in the wake of the global recession of 2008, it shares important
with other theories that may be more managerial in style. For the market to flourish, neoliberals should understand that institutional quality and stability could smooth the avenue
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for capital to move to its most efficient and productive place. In his seminal work,
Douglas North (1990), incorporates a very basic view of the interaction institutions have
with the economy. He summarizes that
“the specific institutional constraints dictate the margins at
which organizations operate and hence make intelligible
the interplay between the rules of the game and the
behavior of the actors” (North, 1990, p. 110).
Institutions drive development because they frame the relationships citizens have with the
government, the way businesses lead their productive capacities and react to market
pressures, and the way in which people act and react to one another. Because of the
nature of these institutions, North is concerned with prescriptive free market economics;
even though neo-liberal theory posits that the invisible hand of the market will allocate
capital to its most efficient areas, perfect markets do not exist and some inefficiency will
always be present. For order in a fast-paced and integrated global market, institutions
must help direct the movement of capital.
Other authors also explain the important of institutions towards state development
and growth. In fact, it is an empirically sound hypothesis. Janine Aron (2000) employs
regression analysis on a number of variables connected with institutional quality, from
ease of business to relative amounts of social capital. She finds that the quality of
institutions on investment (both private and public) show indirect linkages with economic
growth. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (2006) explore the role of institutions in a
“developmental state,” claiming that “good governance” composes competent, but not
overreaching, institutions such as those that protect property rights. Gwartney, Holcombe
and Lawsome (2006) investigate the interaction between institutional quality, with a
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focus on economic freedom, and public and private investment (separately), and also find
that they tend to inform growth and development.
This analysis is most interested in tax institutions. Drawing from the history of
state building in Europe, and more recent studies in sub-Saharan Africa, Deborah
Bräutigam (2008) specifically discusses the importance of tax capacity. She concludes,
“well-designed tax systems can consolidate stable institutions in developing countries,
increase revenues, refocus government spending on public priorities, and improve
democratic accountability” (et. al., 2008, p. 1). Furthermore, the importance of these
institutions lies in taxation’s nature as a social contract between the state and its citizens.
If it is optimal for both sides, taxation serves its purpose in enhancing democracy. Vito
Tanzi and Howell H. Zee (1992) explore both the conceptual and empirical linkages from
public finance to long-term growth. They find few robust results from empirical
literature, but explain that, if taken from the perspective of endogenous growth theory
(that growth is primarily a result of factors within the economy itself), their results do
point to some important lessons. This includes
“recommend[ed] changes in the instruments of public
finance in the direction that theory has deemed important
for enhancing growth, such as the adoption of policies to
improve the neutrality of taxation, promote human capital
accumulation, and lesson inequality” (Tanzi & Zee, 1992,
p. 201).
These findings are qualified in a later piece by the same authors (2000) that analyze more
specific problems involving the strengthing of tax policy in developing countries. These
include lower levels of human capital and higher rates of inequality that force countries to
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adopt tax policies that are “possible rather than the pursuit of the optimal” (et. al., 2000,
p. 300).
The discussion above outlines how institutions can support growth and
development, but the effects of illicit flows on institutions are opposite. African countries
tend to face significant problems with institutional capacity. Ineffective institutions and
extensive poverty result in narrow tax bases, which lead to a vicious cycle where
governments are constrained in their ability to raise revenue, which can support
institution-building and enhance development. Governments, who are ironically one of
the largest stakeholders in raising revenue, may actually be their own worst enemies
when it comes to effective taxation. Atul Kohli (2004) refers part of this to the problem
of a culture of neo-patrimonialism, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, describing it as
“the façade of a modern state, [where] public officeholders tend to treat public resources
as their personal patrimony” (et. al., 2004, p. 9). Furthering this, Richard M. Bird (et. al.
2006) views illicit flows through tax avoidance and evasion in a larger political economic
relationship. They use regression analysis to explore the role of institutions in improving
tax collection in developing countries. One of their primary concerns is the issue of tax
morale. This is intrinsically related to tax effort, or the willingness to pay taxes. They
hypothesize that “the level of tax effort is [also] expected to be strongly connected to the
‘exit option’- the decision to conduct, fully or partially, economic activity in the informal
sector (the shadow economy)” (et. al., 2006, p. 22). This is the framework for their
hypothesis that then focuses on common issues in developing countries, including
inequality. They posit that high inequality damages trust and solidarity between the goals
of different social classes. The tension lies in fairness of taxes and who receives the
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benefits of fiscal policy. Because this is often at odds in highly unequal societies, tax
efforts remain low and widespread tax avoidance and evasion persists. Regression results
from a selection of institutional variables, political voice and, separately, the size of the
shadow economy show statistically significant correlations with tax effort. Taxpayer buyin may indeed help strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of tax institutions, while
opportunities to operate outside of the formal economy can have the opposite effect. The
notion of elite buy-in is particularly important for this analysis because in developing
countries with low tax bases, these are the incomes that should represent a large portion
of the tax revenue. Also, this group often has the greatest access to capital and is also the
most well connected in the global economy, solidifying their importance for state
development in today’s context. Max Everest-Philips (2009) adds that
“widespread tax evasion, avoidance and exemptions
suggest elites believe that the state has neither
transformational political leadership nor any elite
consensus for addressing weak or corrupt political
institutions. Weak elite tax morale results in a large shadow
economy with widespread tax evasion and avoidance”
(Everest-Philips, 2009, p. 17).
This echoes the idea that buy-in, or legitimacy, is essential for institutions to be effective.
Otherwise, capital is apt to move outside of formal markets.
It is also worth noting the role that some private actors may have in driving illicit
financial flows. Kari Heggstad and Odd-Heldge Fjelstad (2010) compile and assess the
existing literature on this topic. With tax evasion, studies by the US Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations (ibid. Heggstad et. al., 2010) found that, on multiple
occasions, some financial institutions were “aggressively marketing methods of hiding
money from national tax authorities” (et. al., 2010, p. 5). Many times, this money is
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directed towards “secrecy jurisdictions” or “tax havens.” These are places where private
actors hold money, receive the utmost confidentiality, and take advantage of tax benefits.
While the tax benefit is of particular interest to any private actor that is looking to hold
money, illicit flows are attracted to confidentiality. While there is not much written on the
marketing methods from financial institutions seeking capital from Africa, it can be
inferred that the presence of secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens, with which there exists
more literature for the continent, does have an effect. Furthermore, there are numerous
accounts of political and business elite in African countries that have sizeable amounts of
assets out of their countries into these places. As a summary, Professor Njuguna Ndung’u
(2007), the current Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, explains it clearly. Speaking
on the importance of institution building as a necessary requisite to stymie the illicit
financial outflows, particularly capital flight, from Africa, he says:
“the costs of this financial hemorrhage have been
significant for African countries. In the short run, massive
capital outflows and drainage of national savings have
undermined growth by stifling private capital formation. In
the medium to long term, delayed investments in support of
capital formation and expansion have caused the tax base to
remain narrow” (Ndung’u, 2007).
Illicit Flows, Private Actors and Resource Extraction
The scope of this thesis focuses on the SACU region, which is rich in natural
resources. There is a large body of literature that explains that natural resource sector is
often ripe for illicit activities. Natural resource abundance is often thought of as a curse in
developing countries for both political and economic reasons; it is associated with
corruption, dictatorships and political instability, and can lead to Dutch Disease effectswhere a dependence on exporting resources appreciates the currency, raises the price of
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other goods, and subsequently makes diversification of the economy difficult. The first
question that we must ask is: Why are foreign companies attracted to investment in
natural resources? This garners a pretty straightforward answer. Natural resource
commodities are lucrative ventures, especially in today’s market of high commodity
prices for primary goods. Natural resource extraction requires much fixed capital, along
with the latest technology to extract resources most efficiently. For developing countries,
raising this capital when there are other budget priorities may be a difficult task; MNEs
tend to have the capital advantage to engage in such activities. Furthermore, labor
standards in developing countries aren’t as strong as in richer parts of the world, and
coupled with an abundance of unskilled labor, variable costs to operate tend to be lower.
What is interesting about this neo-liberally prescriptive assessment, though, is that private
investment in natural resources should be approached more prudently. Natural resource
extraction is often riddled in corruption, and sometimes conflict- both generally thought
of as highly risky environments to operate in. John Bray (2003) echoes the concern for
the culture of neo-patrimonialism, saying that it makes it lucrative for local leaders to
accept foreign investment. He examines the business motives of foreign actors, saying
“the ‘major’ companies in both [petroleum and mining]
sectors need to build up new resources as existing reserves
become depleted. The ‘junior’ companies hope to make
their fortunes by taking risks in regions where more
established companies are reluctant to venture” (Bray,
2003, p. 289).
In addition to the ability to maintain or gain market share, part of the profit motive for
foreign companies actually includes the risk premiums involved, regardless of the
circumstances. Moran (2006) analyzes the challenge from the view of foreign direct
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investment opportunities for the host country, he points out to a particular phenomenon in
contract arrangements that he deems the “obsolescing bargain model” (et. al., 2006, pp.
77–80). This occurs when, once open to FDI in an extractive industry, host countries
require renegotiation of contracts, normally to share in assets, if the projects are
successful. The obsolescing contract can ensure mutual destruction in the success of FDI
because the host country erects barriers to FDI and loses credibility. Since extractive
resources and infrastructure are also vulnerable to bribery and corruption, the benefits of
FDI harder to attain. Moran explains that contracts to begin projects, or project partners
themselves, can be obtained through special relationships (bribery and corruption are
normally political in nature). Both developing and developed countries are at fault in
these instances because both parties are obligated to see “success” (i.e. profits, not
necessarily efficiency) in the project, while maintaining both at privileged status. This
political economy of resource extraction can be quite problematic when there are weak
mechanisms to address the issue.
Jonathan M. Winer and Trifin J. Roule (2003) argue that globalization has indeed
come with more regulation of financial flows, particularly through initiatives to stop
illicit flows of drugs and money laundering from crime syndicates. However,
international financial regulation is lacking in the natural resource sector.
“The closest the current standards come to dealing with
these issues are the requirements that financial institutions
eschew the proceeds of corruption and they respect UN
sanctions [if conflict is involved in extraction]. While these
standards have existed in principle for a long time,
enforcement is very recent and remains incomplete” (Winer
& Roule, 2003, p. 163).
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They point out that the current global financial system fosters illicit activity in this sector.
The actors involved in illicit flows of natural resources seem to use common social and
physical networks that include: informal local banking, natural infrastructure, physical
infrastructure built under the auspices of certain conditions of lax financial regulations,
import-export companies that may engage in transfer price manipulation, and
international banking schemes in secrecy jurisdictions.
According to African Economic Outlook (2012) some of the biggest challenges
faced in the natural resource sector include the clause that many MNE subsidiaries and
countries make with parent companies in developed and emerging markets that require
strong confidentiality. This creates an environment of secrecy where accounting rules
may be manipulated for tax evasive purposes. MNEs operating in the natural resource
sector are often shrouded in more secrecy than other sectors. Accordingly, there is a
logical assumption that developing countries rich in natural resources are not benefiting
from the amount of taxes they can gain from the sector itself. This moves beyond a
simplistic description that poor countries lack the capacity to do this.
Transfer Price Manipulation
Transfer pricing is a mechanism often used in MNE operations as goods move
along a multi-jurisdictional production process. Abusive of this mechanism, TPM, occurs
is the “over- or under invoicing of these transfer prices. It is generally understood as a
response to external pressures such as government regulations (Eden, 2012, p. 206).
Transfer price manipulation is an illicit flow that endangers developing countries ability
to create capable and legitimate institutions. To assess TPM, we must first understand of
transfer pricing. Jack Hirschleifer (1956) provides one of the first comprehensive
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assessments of transfer pricing. He argues from a fairly strict neo-liberal standpoint,
saying that if transfer pricing is going to be practiced between foreign affiliates, it must
respond to market pressure in a rational and efficient manner; transfer prices must follow
the rules of perfectly competitive markets. Although, understanding that perfectly
competitive markets do not exist, he also provides a prescription on transfer pricing under
more realistic assumptions. Concisely, he says
“[the] market price is the correct transfer price only where
the commodity being transferred is produced in a
competitive market, that is, competitive in the theoretical
sense that no single producer considers himself large
enough to influence price by his own output decision. If the
market is imperfectly competitive, or where no market for
the transferred commodity exists, the correct procedure is
to transfer at a marginal cost (given certain simplifying
conditions) or at a some price between marginal cost and
market price in the most general case” (Hirschleifer, 1956,
p. 172).
Generally, the purpose of having subsidiaries is a company strategy to both operate closer
to the good in order to reduce overall costs. Because of this, it makes economic sense to
conduct subsidiary operations in locations close to fixed capital operations, adequate
marginal price environments (depending on the necessities of things like unskilled or
skilled labor, e.g.), and proximity to resources themselves. Hirschleifer concludes that
pricing outside of either the market price or the marginal transfer price (the next-to
perfect pricing), would distort the market in a way that could produce suboptimal results
for the different subsidiaries involved in the trade.
Thomas Horst (1971) explores the relationship that multinational enterprises take
with differing tariff rates across countries. His view, like Hirschleifer’s, also comes from
a neo-liberal standpoint, but the blame for problems like TPM lies in ineffective
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government policy, particularly in countries that practice import substitution. He frames
his argument from the standpoint that MNEs are interested in chasing economies-of-scale
through a maximization of profit and driving down marginal costs. For him, governments
are interested in maintaining macroeconomic stability, which must include a growthoriented business environment. In import substitution, governments set import tariffs
higher with the hope to stimulate business growth in the home country. He finds this
strategy problematic in the fact that MNEs operate in different countries and importsubstitution can create higher operation costs. The high-tariff environment provides
MNEs with the incentive to discriminate prices, which then “renders tax policy impotent”
(et. al., 1971, p. 1068). In this sense, it does not allow the government to use tax policy in
ways that could complement development. Instead, he advocates away from using
import-substitution and to pursue reciprocal tariff reduction agreements to decrease the
ability to manipulate prices, and allow the logic of free trade to play out and reduce prices
through free market mechanisms.
From these theoretical analyses of transfer pricing, we can conclude that the
practice, as it should be in a fair and mostly competitive market, is to chase market
prices. That being said, it makes sense why MNEs choose to engage operations in
countries that decrease overall costs for the company and its subsidiaries, however it also
denies the logic to engage in abusive TPM because it directly contradicts fair market
thinking. Harry Grubert and John Mutti (1991) explore the empirical evidence that shapes
some of these theoretical analyses. Given the different bilateral (and sometimes
multilateral) trade tariff and business tax rate schemes, they are keenly interested in the
willingness of US-based MNEs to operate abroad. Overall they find that taxes and tariffs
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have a significant impact on the willingness of MNEs to operate in foreign countries,
particularly from their hypothesis of complementarities. That is, MNEs have a vested
interested in operating in tax-friendly countries, but also where there are already existing
patterns of trade that reinforce the economic relationship. For them, these reinforce each
other. Not surprisingly, this is a result in trade where countries with US-MNE affiliates
and lower tax rates see higher investment in capital goods flowing into the country. At
the same time, intrafirm trade is also increased through these established networks.
Deborah Swenson (2000) bridges the gap between the theories behind transfer
pricing, and transfer price manipulation. She hypothesizes that, since TPM is a reaction to
government regulation, the practice will move with corporate tax policy. She measures
the impact of tariffs between companies operating in a group of largely rich and
developed countries and finds that a lowering of foreign corporate taxes of 5% results in
an increase of transfer prices by 0.024%. This is important for two reasons, first it can
serve the argument that companies lower their tax burdens (e.g. engage in TPM) in the
face of higher taxes, but also, as a result of the scant improvement in prices, companies
are profit-motivated to the extent that paying any taxes at all is too big of a burden. Harry
Grubert (2003) offers an econometric model to depict the willingness of MNEs to engage
in TPM. Like previous authors, his argument is set in the context that firms will chase
operating environments that have lower costs. From his previous analysis with John
Mutti (1991), we understood that higher levels of intrafirm trade occurred where there
were stronger trade links already established between countries and companies,
particularly those were it is complimented by lower tax regimes. In the more recent piece
(2003), he argues that the very existence of these relationships enables increasing number
28

of opportunities to engage in intercompany trade. So the logic follows that there is a
higher probability of TPM. His addition comes from companies operating in different tax
jurisdictions. The incentives are created, amongst the environment of high intercompany
transactions, to “take advantage of the ambiguity in the application of transfer pricing
rules” (et. al., 2003, p. 231). This alludes that there is a difference in capabilities of legal
systems, to either adjudicate existing laws on transfer pricing or even have such laws
codified, which are both relevant questions considering the different institutional
development levels between rich and poor countries. Interested in the aptitude for
companies to shift income where costs are lower, he uses a variable called “shifting
incentive,” and finds that a 1 percent increase in local subsidiary tax rates, beyond a 25
percent ‘average’ foreign corporate tax rate, results in increases of intercompany
transactions by 3 percent. Coincidentally, when measured separately, 1 percent change in
effective local tax rates is associated with a 3 percent increase in the amount of
intercompany transactions. Beyond statistical constraints such as collinearity, this
suggests that in a scheme of higher taxes, once the environment proves ripe for intrafirm
trade to take place, the practice of transfer pricing will continue. Therefore, the
vulnerability for firms to TPM remains.
Prem Sikka and Hugh Willmott (2010) are concerned with the extent to which
TPM has misallocated economic “surpluses” away from government budgets. They write
from the view that in the globalized world, MNEs have largely taken advantage of an
opaque set of international laws and norms, and have “gamed the system.” Transfer
pricing is a coordinated effort by MNEs, through many actors such as lawyers,
accountants, political connections, business leaders and more, to achieve competitive
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advantages and economies of scale. For them, globalization has facilitated the ability for
MNEs to by-pass state authority to the extent that The Times (ibid. 2006) named TPM
“one of the most significant challenges” in the new era of globalization. Sikka and
Willmott (2010) draw on evidence from the few places where they can obtain it, namely:
the amount of corporate taxes paid by MNEs (a potential indication of movements
towards “low-tax” jurisdictions, or those with loose or non-codified laws on pricing), the
amount of intercompany transactions reported by MNEs (as seen before, provides more
opportunities for income-shifting), and also the number of lawsuits governments have
filed to fight abusive transfer pricing practices. Unfortunately, most of this information is
not adequately reported in developing countries, pointing to the fact that many
developing countries don’t have the human capacity to bring legal suits against large
MNEs with billions of dollars in capital and teams of lawyers.
From this review of transfer pricing and TPM we can come to the conclusion that
it is a coordinated strategy that actors can use in order to subvert institutional authority. It
is coordinated in the sense that it is deliberate and thought-out; it is strategic in the sense
that it is an action made to produce better results for whoever is engaging in the activities.
Given the knowledge of illicit financial flows, natural resource extraction and the
complicity that some MNEs may take, it is safe to infer that those involved are motivated
by improved profit margins through manipulation. In a sense, the practice largely benefits
from the new financial arrangements in the current era of globalization. Recalling the
statistics from the World Investment Reports, in 1992 and 2011, the introduction of this
thesis mentioned that MNE parent companies has risen from 35,000 in 1990 to over
100,000 currently, likewise, the number of foreign subsidiaries has grown even more,
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from 150,000 in 1990 to nearly 900,000. Some private companies have benefited by
globalization not only in their ability to chase economies of scale and integrate into an
international consumer market. Others, often in collusion with corrupt public officials,
have also benefited by their ability to dodge tax responsibilities in the face of different
regulations across different borders.
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Section Three: Trends and Characteristics of Transfer Pricing
There are indications that TPM is a growing problem for countries in Africa. As
we can recall, a Global Financial Integrity (2008) report on illicit flows documented that
illicit financial flows through Africa alone totaled about $854 billion, but due to the
measuring constraints, the total is more likely near $1.8 trillion; 60 - 65% of this total is
thought to be tax evasive activities. A 2010 report by the same group (Hollingshead,
2010) used a sophisticated methodology for estimating the extent of TPM through the use
of corporate tax rates provided by PricewaterhouseCoopers and Heritage Foundation, and
government revenue data obtained from the World Bank. The analysis of a number of
developing countries estimated a loss of potential tax revenue from TPM to be between
$98 – $107 billion, from 2002 and 2006; for Africa as a whole this number is likely a
yearly average of nearly $3.8 billion. Despite this alarming number, there are significant
holes in the amount of data available; the only African countries included in the analysis
are Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. Because of these data constraints it is certain that
the actual amount of revenue lost in Africa due to TPM is significantly underestimated.
Another method to explore this issue is through the use of information from
accounting firms and NGOs who have done proxy research, as well as through recent
actions by developing country governments to regulate transfer pricing. With these
resources, we can analyze the extent to which abusive practices are growing.
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Transfer Pricing from a Private Perspective
Transfer price manipulation is gaining much more attention as a global problem.
Ernst & Young, one of the world’s largest accounting firms, recently increased the
amount of research on transfer pricing within private firms. Since 1995, they have
produced detailed reports on international tax matters, with a specific focus transfer
pricing, it culminates into a yearly Global Transfer Pricing Survey. In fact, they posit
TPM as “the leading international tax issue.” The basis for their research is the fact that
governments are continually trying to raise revenue through taxation, that transfer pricing
is increasingly becoming a tool used in MNE operations, and that some governments are
reacting to this by ramping up efforts to enforce tax laws to stymie any abusive practices.
One example of the increased attention from governments, though not fully a result of
increased TPM, is that the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) increased the
staff focused on international tax issues by 2,000 employees between 2009 and 2010.
This is not a trend that is limited to rich countries though; they also indicate that
emerging markets are also increasing enforcement measures in an effort to raise
revenues.
Because of pressure to increase profitability, the Global Transfer Pricing Survey
points out that transfer pricing is becoming an increasingly important practice for
companies to engage in. Ernst & Young has gleaned the following as the most important
current trends:
•

Transfer pricing as “absolutely critical”: An average of 75 percent of parent and
subsidiary companies surveyed mentioned that transfer pricing will be critical or
very important to their organizations, if not now, in the next 2 years.
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Furthermore, tax authorities surveyed showed varying interest, depending on the
industry and sector; natural resource mining received 30% interest.
Figure 2: Transfer pricing will be "absolutely critical" or "very important" for
their group in the next two years3
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Source: Ernst & Young, Global Transfer Pricing Survey 2010
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•

Rules are in flux: Reviews of intrafirm trade have increased dramatically, from 7
percent in 2007 to 42 percent in 2010. Governments and international economic
institutions such as the OECD have revised laws on transfer pricing in the past
few years alone.

•

Trends in controversy management: Litigation of transfer pricing disputes is low.
Only 3 percent in 2007 and 10 percent now. Furthermore, only 18 percent of
surveyed companies said they reported abusive transfer pricing practices to the
proper authority.

•

Tax and efficient supply chain management: Tax considerations remain one of
the most important reasons for restructuring and operating.

•

Rising audit risk: The number of audits has been increasing, particularly in
emerging economy jurisdictions. 66 percent of respondent companies were
audited, up from 52 percent in 2007. Over ! of companies considered
documentation more important now than previously.

Note: Only companies in countries that were both surveyed by Ernst & Young and
appeared in the United States Geological Survey Mineral Yearbooks 2010 and 2011 as
owning mining investments in the SACU region (See Appendix B for further details) are
included in the Figures in this section. For this reason, percentages between the
description and actual figures may not match.
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Figure 3: Transfer pricing policy has been examined by a tax authority in any
country since 2006.
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•

More attention paid to documentation: Surveyed companies cite increased
documentation of transfer pricing is to reduce risk of audit and litigation.
Documentation has increased to 41 percent. (See Figure 4 below)

There are two major themes that underpin the Ernst & Young analysis. First, companies
in rich and emerging economies are the most documented in terms of using transfer
pricing in company operations. Following the literature review on transfer pricing, this
increase means that there is also increased opportunity to engage in TPM. Second,
documentation for strategies for transfer pricing are scant if even available for companies
in developing countries, speaking to the importance of creating a strategy for them. A
table depicting a selection of survey responses is provided in Appendix A. This
incorporates the most pertinent survey responses for this thesis, and is limited to countries
that were surveyed by Ernst & Young who also engage in the extractive natural resource
sector in the SACU region (United States Geological Survey 2010, 2011).
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Figure 4: Transfer pricing documentation is prepared concurrently, on a globally
coordinated basis
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Transfer Pricing Trends in the Developing World
Transfer pricing is a standard practice in MNEs, and is increasingly used as the
production process continues to “go global.” The Global Transfer Pricing Survey pointed
to a number of important trends, which particularly point to action that may be taken by
governments to regulate transfer pricing. By exploring some of the general trends in the
developing world, we can supplement private trends with those from the public sector.
The first major trend from the developing world is that governments are aware that
transfer pricing is increasing as a standard business practice, forcing policymakers to
address its regulation. Governments are not necessarily tasked with creating a profit in
the same way that private companies are, they are tasked with maintaining and operating
a state. Thus, the one incentive for governments is to collect tax revenue. In 2009,
China’s State Administration of Taxation (SAT) made all documentation of transfer
prices mandatory after a 200 RMB threshold has been reached. There is evidence that this
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requirement is further expanding to lower thresholds. Now, the Chinese tax authority is
ranked as the 3rd most aggressive tax authority (Shira & Carey, 2011). Similarly, the
Ghanaian Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) announced in March
2012 that it would be introducing new rules for MNEs reporting requirements of transfer
prices. This came in response to estimates that nearly $36 million were lost annually due
to transfer pricing irregularities since a substantial increase in the number of MNEs
entering the country after a large oil discovery in 2007 (Asiamah, 2012).
Another trend in the developing world is the move to conform to international
standards. The most well-known and respected standard regulating transfer pricing is the
arms-length principle that is stated in the OECD’s Model Tax Convention 2010.
Indonesia has recently started moving towards conforming to these standards by adopting
language in the line with the Convention. (Transfer Pricing Associates 2010; KPMG,
2011). Also, Egypt has been working with the OECD since 2005 to develop their own
version of the OECD guidelines, and even made a move to establish a Transfer Pricing
Division to aid in documentation through the countries own tax laws. It is the first of its
kind to be issued in the Arabic language, helping to ease understanding (Mahon, 2011;
Transfer Pricing Associates 2011). South Africa, one of the SACU countries, recently
revised its transfer pricing laws to closely resemble the OECD guidelines, existing
regulations tended to create uncertainty because they focused on isolated transactions
rather than those involved in an increasingly complex production process.
These trends from developing country governments make clear what the growing
approaches to transfer pricing are. First, increased regulation is a move to protect due
revenues, and second, they are motivated to conform to international guidelines, or
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“rules-of-the-game.” The first trend makes logical sense. The second is also motivated by
the first, but it may also follow a move to conforming to a global economy that demands
clear rules and a culture of doing business.
Factors to Consider
Overshadowing this assessment, though, is the fact that transfer pricing regulations
are still inadequate in many developing countries. Oftentimes, they are left undefined or
give far too much power to political individuals, creating a vicious cycle; when TPM
occurs, the state and development is undermined, and the environment for the illicit
practice is reinforced. This is due to a mixture of capability, risk (from the private actor
perspective) and incentive (connected to corruption). PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011),
another major international accounting firm, also reports on transfer pricing. They
published an article outlining the risks involved with transfer pricing in Africa
specifically. Their report reinforce the literature that developing countries lack the
institutional capacity, particularly in tax institutions, to enforce or create laws. Simply put
“’the lower the sophistication of tax authorities in a particular country, the higher the
[transfer pricing] risk’” (et. al., 2011). Following these findings, they expect that, as
transfer pricing continues to be a medium for abuse to take place, and as countries and
regional organizations address the issue more clearly, there will be a growing number of
cases from Africa. Claiming it to be launched in 2011, the report also refers to an African
Transfer Pricing Dashboard as a database to explore transfer pricing on the continent.
However, there is currently no evidence that this has occurred, and representatives from
PwC have not commented.
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So far, this analysis has remained fairly neutral on the specific job functions that
allow TPM to take place. Yet, it is also important to understand the special role that
auditors take in the flow of illicit finance. In a study on money laundering and organized
crime in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, Andre
Standing and Hennie van Vuuren (2003) completed a survey of auditors who worked for
multinational firms. The reason for surveying auditors was that they are in a unique place
in the actor-agent relationship between MNEs doing business abroad and the ability for
illicit economic activity to take place; they are in a position of authority to report accurate
accounting (unless of course they are involved in corrupt practices themselves). Although
inherently different from money laundering, the role of auditors remains similar when
considering TPM and will thus serve as a proxy. While the scope of the respondents is as
extensive as one would hope, those surveyed covered a number of different auditors from
across the SADC region, including Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland (all also
members of SACU). There were a number of interesting responses that give clues to their
interaction with illicit flows. Notably, they find that auditors are often unaware of laws
and mechanisms used by state authorities to combat illicit flows, and that the difficulty
involved in identifying the flow itself further muddles the issue. This is only compounded
by the illicit nature of the transactions themselves, as corruption and incentives can serve
to undermine the mechanisms themselves.
Despite the difficulty in obtaining hard data on TPM, this section, along with the
literature review, demonstrates that there is available research and investigation that, once
synthesized, points to the issues importance and growth. First, TPM is a standard practice
in many MNEs (Baker, 2005; Ernst & Young, 2010). Second, a culture of corruption that
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often clouds the extractive natural resource sector, particularly in developing countries. In
fact, a database provided in Appendix B, extensively depicts MNE involvement in natural
resource extraction in SACU countries, demonstrating that there may be ample
opportunities for clandestine activity. Lastly, developing countries face the extra hurdle
that their relative lack of institutional development leaves them at a disadvantage when
enforcing and creating laws that can stymie abusive TPM. In the next section, the thesis
explores the natural resource sector and the laws surrounding pricing and extraction in
the SACU region. This will provide the basis for a strategy that uses existing institutional
arrangements (with some suggestions for reform), as well as integrates international
standards.
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Section Four: Country Profiles- Extractive Resources and Associated Legislation
Illicit financial flows such as transfer price manipulation include those that are
codified in law, but also those that may lack legal status (or, technically legal). They are
harmful for economic and human development, and the development of sound
institutions. The problematic history of illicit flows in the natural resource sector provides
a ripe environment for them to flourish. This section explores the extent of natural
resource extraction in the member countries of the Southern African Customs Union,
along with the associated legislation related to transfer pricing. Additionally, it examines
the basic SACU framework, to analyze its strength in relation to regulation of natural
resources. This section will reveal that transfer pricing in this sector is an under-legalized
area for SACU countries as well as within the organization itself. This increases the
perception that TPM has the ability to work through the existing system quite easily.
Overall, natural resource extraction is an integral component to the economies of
SACU countries. Exports of ores and metals (i.e. minerals), the proxy for what this paper
has been referring to as natural resources, tend to make up large portions of their export
base. Most recent data from the World Bank shows that they accounted for 14.54% of
exports in Botswana (2010), about 31% in Namibia (2008) and about 33% in South
Africa (2010). As a portion of exports in Lesotho and Swaziland, extracted minerals do
not account for more than 5% of reported exports, but evidence from the U.S. Geological
Survey show that they are likely to grow in importance. Below is a brief overview of
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mining in the SACU region, country-by-country, along with the major private actors
involved in the industry. Much of the information was gathered from the United States
Geological Survey’s Mineral Yearbooks 2009 and 2010.
Botswana
With approximately 32% of the world’s known diamond reserves, Botswana is
known for being the world’s largest exporter of the resource. There are also deposits of
base metals, coal, salt and soda ash that are extracted, as well as other minerals which are
not as widely mined but do exist, including, asbestos, feldspar, graphite, gypsum, iron
and manganese. According to Harold R. Newman (2010) at the United States Geological
Survey (USGS), despite these mineral endowments, Botswana still remains one of the
most underexplored areas of the world for natural resources. This is due to the fact that
the country is of particularly rough terrain and the infrastructure is not as extensive in
other parts of Africa, no less, the world. While diversification away from diamond
mining remains a significant hurdle for the future of Botswana’s economy, the prospect
that there are untapped resources in the country may be able to assist following a decline
in its extraction.
Unlike many African countries, Botswana is widely considered a leader in
economic growth, education, and good governance. A number of authors (Barclay, 2008;
Good, 1992; Gramajo, 2005) have attributed part of the success of Botswana to relatively
effective institutions, as well as cooperation between public and private actors. From the
onset of independence, the government made it a priority to cooperate between the
politically influential cattle-herding population, and foreign actors in the diamond
business. The state was effective in redirecting revenue to human development to
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reinforce growth and legitimize state actors. For example, the government has taken the
HIV/AIDS epidemic seriously. In 1987, it introduced the National AIDS Control
Programme, and updated it with the National Strategic Framework in 2003. These are
positive developments considering that the country has one of the highest rates of its
prevalence worldwide. Also, by law, funds from diamond revenues guarantee every
Botswanan an education up to the age of 14. All of these factors, a favorable mineral
investment climate, and relative political and social stability have come together to make
Botswana a particularly attractive place for international companies to operate. Prominent
parent companies operating from Canada, Luxembourg, United States and United
Kingdom make up the main investors. Associated, and as reported by the USGS, the
Botswana central government has stakes in all major mining operations, but in practice,
resource extraction has “operated mainly on a privately-owned free market basis”
(Newman, 2010).
The monopoly for granting rights to mining resources in Botswana is held solely
by the state. The legal framework for mining is set out in the Mines and Minerals Act,
1999. This piece of legislation broadly covers the state’s involvement and sets its role as
the preliminary decision-maker for mineral extraction. It also solidifies the government’s
position in retaining a percentage of royalties. In terms of mining royalties, Part X
Sections 1 and 2 states that
“subject to the provisions of this Part, the holder of a
mineral concession shall be liable to pay royalties to the
Government on any mineral concession by him in the
course of the exercise of his rights thereunder at the rates
and in the manner prescribed under this section. The
royalties payable shall be the following percentages of
gross market value….” (Mines & Mineral Act 1999).
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The legislation then continues, setting a percentage price for the amount of royalties
depending on the type of mineral extracted. Reinforcing this law is the fact that Botswana
has a relatively good track record of mineral management and overall governance.
There is no available data or data estimates of the extent of TPM in Botswana.
Despite the extent of government involvement in managing mineral royalties, as well as
directing them to pertinent areas for human development, it lacks any basic legislation in
regards to transfer pricing (KPMG, 2011). In fact, the Mines and Minerals Act
specifically states that proper price setting “excludes any barter, swap, exchange, or
special transfer pricing arrangement,” (Mines and Minerals Act, 1999, Art. X, Sec. 6)
which may, in fact, provide a legal cover for MNEs to engage in legally illicit operations.
From the USGS survey outlined in Appendix B, there is extensive foreign involvement in
natural resource extraction, and according to the survey’s country report, private
companies operate fairly freely. In this sense, Botswana can be characterized as
particularly vulnerable to TPM flows. Transfer pricing is under-legalized, perhaps even
encouraged by legislation that excludes regulation on the practice. This does not follow
proper market-based price setting, since it should include adjustments for all of the costs
that firms are expected to incur. The ignorance of the law may actually serve to the
detriment of Botswana as it could be potentially losing revenue.
Lesotho
Lesotho has a long history of mining. Diamonds remain the most prominent
resource, although there are also deposits of agate, clay, sand, gravel and stone. However,
most of the extraction of these other resources serves a narrow domestic consumption
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market rather than moving internationally. Despite the widespread belief that Lesotho has
substantial amounts of minerals, there has not been much investment in exploration due
to the poor condition of physical infrastructure. In fact, the USGS reports that there is no
future increased investment in mining that is expected (Newman, 2010). After the USGS
publication, though, Gem Diamonds, a UK-based company, announced that it would be
investing an additional $230 million into a diamond mine in Lesotho, as well as opening
a cutting and polishing plant (Finance24, 2012). This is no small feat for a country who’s
2010 GDP was just over $2.1 billion (World Bank, 2012). Development such as these are
a reminder of how quickly private actors can make decisions to begin or increase
operations internationally. As of now, the ownership of diamond mines is shared between
the Lesotho government and companies located in the United Kingdom. It will be
interesting to assess the future impact of the Gem Diamonds investment. In the
meantime, many challenges remain for Lesotho as a whole as it remains fairly
underdeveloped.
Despite the lower starting point in exploiting Lesotho’s mineral resources, there is
a substantial history of legislation governing this area. The Mines and Minerals Act 2005
governs the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, and the Precious Stones
Order 1970 governs the production, sale and export of precious stones such as diamonds
(Newman, 2010). Both laws outline the royalties paid to the government, much like
Botswana. Specifically, the 1970 legislation states that 15 percent of diamond royalties
are to be paid to the government. Although, the obvious difference is that Lesotho’s
resources have been vastly underexploited compared to Botswana. Lesotho has not had
the same opportunity to direct royalties towards development needs, nor does it share the
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same track record in governance. Though, with Gem Diamonds’ investment of $230 into
diamond extraction (Finance24, 2012), we should soon be able to track the potential
impact that royalties have.
For transfer pricing, Lesotho relies on broader tax law. Direct tax law in Section
113 bestows a broad range of powers to a tax commissioner to distribute and allocate
income to reflect the true income of both corporations and individuals (SADC, 2012).
Supposedly this rule is applied to stymie any tax avoidance, including transfer pricing.
However, the vague and extraordinary powers may actually create the incentives to
engage in clandestine activities. It is more important to mention that transfer pricing does
not receive explicit mention and is therefore left in legal limbo. Given that Lesotho
remains a fairly underdeveloped country, as well as the fact that legal development
doesn’t reflect the growing challenges of MNEs and cross-border illicit financial
activities, Lesotho is vulnerable to these flows. This is also only likely to increase as
foreign companies perk interest in the availability of natural resources.
Namibia
Namibia is one of the world’s top producers of diamonds (3rd) and uranium (4th
and accounting for 8% of world’s production). Other than these two, it also has deposits
of: arsenic, gold, lead, manganese, silver, zinc, dolomite, granite, marble, salt,
semiprecious stones, sodalite, sulfur, and wollastonite. There is a diverse group of foreign
actors who are involved in resource extraction, including: Australia, Canada, Germany,
Iran, Luxembourg, South Africa and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the substantial
trade relationship between Namibia and the United States supports this industry; a large
amount of minerals are exported to the US, Namibian imports include capital and
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technology to support the extractive industry. Economic outlooks see steady growth in
the economy as the world continues to recover from the 2008 recession, and demand for
diamonds continues to increase. Though, long-term prospects for growth may be
constrained by a gradual decline in the amount of the resources available for mining. To
stymie this, government policies are promoting the expansion of investments in other
minerals, as well as attracting monitoring and scanning for additional mineral resources
that are not currently mined. Though, this will continue to be a long-term constraint on
Namibia, and economic diversification should remain a top priority.
Namibian laws for the natural resource sector are outlined in the Minerals Act,
1992, which grants permissions for prospecting and mining, and the Diamond Act, 1999,
which provides further detail for law regarding specifically diamond mining- particularly
in setting prices. Notably, it establishes a Diamond Board of Namibia that is responsible
for creating a diamond fund to direct royalties towards development measures, and is
supposed to act as a middleman for the various controls that are outlined in the law itself.
The limited transfer pricing law in Namibia requires MNEs registered in the country to
conform to an arms-length principle (KPMG, 2012). This is a generally accepted
agreement that transfer prices will reflect market value for goods. However, while the
Diamond Board is supposed to act as a middleman, the Minister of Mines and Energy has
complete control over setting of prices along this arms-length principle. Part VI Section
44 states
“the market value of any unpolished diamond shall be
determined in writing by the Minister having regard to the
value agreed upon between the person who sells or
otherwise disposes of that diamond and the person to whom
that diamond is sold or otherwise disposed of in an at
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arm’s-length sale and prices which are in the opinion of the
Minister at the particular time paid on international markets
for such diamonds, less any amounts deducted in respect of
fees, charges or levies which are in the opinion of the
Minister charged on international markets” (Diamond Act,
1999).
In effect, the law sets up a perfect environment for corruption to flourish. While on paper,
the accountability in pricing should reflect international norms and standards, the
ultimatum lies with the opinion of the Minister. Thus, a political (i.e. judicial) mechanism
fail to provide appropriate checks and balances. At the same time, a proper market
driving mechanism through the arm’s length principle is denied ability for scrutiny.
Namibian law for transfer pricing seems to have taken one step forward, but two steps
back. Instead it has opened the doors for politicians to set prices at the same time that
private companies may be taking advantage of the underdeveloped legal system.
South Africa
South Africa remains one of the world’s most important countries for mining.
Substantial amounts of the world’s extraction of a number of minerals make up the
industry, including: platinum (79% of global production), chromium (60%), palladium
(41%), manganese (14%), gold (9%), and others. Other important minerals include,
diamond, shale, nickel, iron ore, aluminum and phosphate rock. While mineral extraction
remains a mainstay of the South African economy, there are still some concerns.
Production has increased in a number of notable minerals such as iron ore and shale, but
for the most part, production of other resources is steadily decreasing. Generally, the
South African natural resource extraction sector operates privately, a notable difference
given that most other SACU country governments took a substantial stake in the sector,
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although the government has a preference for domestically owned companies through the
Black Economic Empowerment initiative that has been an important policy in the postapartheid government. Amongst a number of South African companies operating
domestically, foreign actors are quite diverse, including companies from: Australia,
Canada, China, Finland, France, India, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Russia, Singapore,
Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Beyond mineral
diversification, the relative sophistication of the South African financial sector, its
comparative level of development, and political stability continue to make the country an
attractive place to invest. Though, given the gradual decline in the number of some
resources, the South African government should take the creation of a long-term
economic plan for diversification seriously.
Policy for mineral extraction in South Africa is set in the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Act, 2002. The Preamble for the law sets the general tone for the
sector. It says that implementation of the act is
“to make a provision for equitable access to sustainable
development… [that will] promote economic and social
development… emphasizing the need to create an
internationally competitive and efficient administration and
regulatory regime.” (Mineral and Petroleum Resources
Development Act, 2002).
Within the body of legislation itself, it sets out the ownership and regulatory controls for
the mineral sector. Under the auspices that this is for the protection and development of
the sole owners of the resources- South Africans, much control is granted to the Minister
of Mineral Resources and the broader Department of Mineral Resources. Interestingly,
one of the few mentions of finance in the legislation comes towards the end of the
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document in Chapter 7, Section 107, Part 2 which simply states “no regulation relating to
State revenue or expenditure may be made by the Minister except with the concurrence of
the Minister of Finance.” In other words, fiscal policy is the duty of the appropriate
department. Setting appropriate finance arrangements then requires that sector’s specific
department to be left out, regardless of the important information regarding resource
extraction that can be gained from them.
South Africa does have an explicit legal framework for transfer pricing, though.
According to Ernst & Young (2011), the main transfer pricing legislation is set out in the
Income Tax Act of 1962, “Section 31 authorizes tax authority to adjust the consideration
for goods or services to an arm’s length price for the purposes of computing the South
African taxable income of a person.” South Africa, though not a member of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), officially conforms
to its transfer pricing guidelines. Yet, with these regulations in mind, recall the extent to
which trade misinvoicing is pervasive in South Africa. According to the estimates from
Global Financial Integrity (Hollingshead, 2010), South Africa loses a yearly average of
between about $1 billion and nearly $4 billion dollars from this practice. This begs the
question whether this is a larger problem in the less developed legal systems of the other
SACU countries.
Swaziland
Information about the mineral sector in Swaziland is not readily available. This is
despite the country being rich in a number of highly priced minerals such as: coal,
diamond, gold, kaolin and silica, the Swazi natural resource sector has not recently
gained much attention from foreign investors. It may be likely that, as the amount of
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extraction declines in other areas of the world, Swaziland may experience higher levels of
investment. The limited amount of foreign involvement in the mining industry includes
companies based in South Africa and the United Kingdom; government holds a
substantial stake in mining operations as well.
Mineral legislation in Swaziland is fairly new. It is outlined in the Mines and
Mineral Act, No. 4, 2011. This law grants decision-making power for prospecting,
extraction and production licenses to a Mineral Board. Interestingly, the members of the
Board, once chosen, are by law granted immunity from civil proceedings during their
tenure. All the while, the export and import of minerals requires a special license that
functions through a Board process. These two characteristics are a clear avenue for
corrupt actions, as members can grant licenses on an ad hoc basis, and perhaps also enjoy
kickbacks from special relationships. To further this hypothesis, financial payments of
mineral royalties are paid directly “to the iNgwenyama [the King] in trust for the Swazi
Nation,” and “if the Commissioner is satisfied that any minerals sold or disposed of
otherwise than in an arms-length transaction, the Commissioner shall determine the gross
sale value of the minerals…” (Swaziland Government Gazette, Part VIII, Art. 132, Sec. 1
and 4). These legal provisions echo what Atul Kohli mentioned as the neo-patrimonial
state. As evidenced by the numerous developmental challenges faced by Swaziland, the
resources of the state are considered to be personal patrimony of government officials
rather than the people themselves. Overall, the tone of business and government is rooted
in corruption and a lack of democratic accountability. This is the perfect environment for
illicit activities to flourish.
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SACU Framework
Intrafirm trade with the natural resource sector means that there is a point of
origin through a foreign subsidiary within a country, and a number of points where goods
move out of the country. This means that there are many instances in which the
movement of goods is subject to the payment of customs duties. These are the critical
points where transfer price manipulation can take place. The existing framework for the
payment of duties solidifies the importance of the SACU arrangement in confronting
TPM.
The Southern African Customs Union (2007) is the oldest customs union in the
world. Its origins lie in a 1910 agreement for customs cooperation between South Africa
(which included present-day Namibia until the 1990), Basutoland (Lesotho),
Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland. From the onset, the union worked to set a
common external tariff. Also, one of the more recent features of SACU is a revenuesharing formulation, which allocates revenue from customs duties paid amongst the
member countries. In the wake of the post-independence wave that swept much of Africa,
the SACU agreement was renewed and amended in 1969. This process addressed BLNS
(non-South African members) country concerns that South Africa had too much power
within the organization. Until then, South Africa had the sole power to set the customs
duties and excise taxes for the union. There were also concerns that South Africa entered
the union into a number of preferential trade agreements that only benefited itself rather
than all SACU members. From these concerns, the change included a power sharing
agreement. The agreement was further renewed and amended in 2002, and extended the
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democratic process: including Committees and Bodies representing interests and sectors
within member states, and an annually rotating Secretariat to be headquartered in
Windhoek, Namibia. There was also a call to set up a Tribunal to serve as a dispute
settlement mechanism, which though technically written into the agreement, has yet to be
implemented. Furthermore, and of particular interest, given the extent of transfer pricing,
the 2002 agreement addresses a commitment of member countries to respond to
international pressures, including both foreign public and private interests.
Beyond the facilitation of the movement of goods in the region, the 2002 SACU
agreement contains a number of broadly defined objectives. As a summary, they included
three main themes: sustainable development of all SACU countries- a recognition that
member countries are at different levels of development, yet face similar problems;
deepening of the economic relationship between member countries, including a
harmonization of external economic policies; and the creation of a globally competitive
SACU market. To simplify the overall economic objective of SACU, it specifically states
in Part 5, Article 18, Sections 1 and 2, Free Movement of Domestic Products, that
“goods grown, produced or manufactured in the Common
Customs Area, on importation from the area of one
Member State to the area of another Member State, shall be
free of customs duties and quantitative restrictions, except
as provided elsewhere in this Agreement…Member States
have the right to impose restrictions on imports or exports
in accordance with national laws and regulations for the
protection of…health of humans, animals or plants; the
environment; treasures of artistic, historic or archeological
value; public morals; intellectual property rights; national
security; and exhaustible natural resources.” (Southern
African Customs Union, 2002).
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A layout of substantial goals for trade liberalization, followed by a list of exemptions, is
not uncommon in these agreements. The most well known example of this is the extent to
which the World Trade Organization (WTO) allows member countries to protect certain
areas of their economies, which has arguably allowed for developed countries to maintain
high subsidies in agricultural products where developing countries tend to have
competitive advantages. Thus, the SACU agreement is not unique in the regard that it
strives to create a “free” agreement that is, in reality, distorted. The main concern this
paper identifies is that exhaustible resources remain an important component of the
broader regional economy, but they are left out of regulation by SACU. This is
exasperated by stratified policies, per country, regarding taxation and pricing for goods in
this sector. This provides more opportunities for TPM to take place. After the 2002
agreement, the WTO assessed the SACU trade and tax policy and echoed concerns over
regulation of the natural resource sector, saying
“mineral taxation, for example, has enabled the
improvement of basic infrastructure and social services.
Furthermore, the sector is one of the most important foreign
exchange sources and a magnet for foreign investment in
these countries. Large mineral endowment has meant low
tariff protection, and private investment continues to be
encouraged in the sector” (Trade Policy Review Body,
2003, p. vii).
In addition to this, there is concern that tariff rates between member countries are too
complex. Duties for certain goods include ad valorem, specific, mixed, compound and
formulaic duties. This complexity can be confusing, rather than conforming to them in
the way that SACU’s goal to harmonize and simplify customs regulations. In order to
address important issues like the regulation of duties in natural resource trade, and stymie
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any possible transfer price abuse, the process for setting duties needs to be both clear and
enforced by capable authorities.
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Section Five: A Way Forward
In order to address the issue of TPM through multinational enterprises, we must
understand the process. In the Section 1of this paper, Figure 1 conceptualizes how, within
MNEs, goods move out of the country are sold to parent companies or other subsidiaries
along a complex value chain. If the amount of goods is misinvoiced, this is the point
where illicit activities take place. The actors involved include individuals in the private
sector (at both the subsidiary/ies and parent), custom officials, relevant tax authority
higher in the administrative hierarchy, and policymakers that are tasked with framing
laws. Though not directly involved, the issue also involves the citizenry, who often bear
the burden of inefficient governments and illicit flows. To address this issue requires a
multi-pronged approach. This involves addressing both pricing in the natural resource
sector, as well as coordination of broader transfer pricing rules at the country-level.
Given that this issue is of regional customs interest, SACU is the most appropriate
vehicle to drive this process. However, this also involves amendments, and a
strengthening of the capability of SACU members. A sufficient strategy is based on
existing international standards for both transfer pricing, through the OECD, and
transparency in extractive resources, through the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI).
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Integrating International Standards
The OECD is comprised of a group of countries mostly in Europe and North
America. It aims to promote economic growth and development for primarily member
countries, but also provides useful analysis for others. Working towards building an
understanding of new challenges that face the global economy, it also serves to
coordinate policies concerning a range of different topics and issue areas. In the most
recent 2010 Transfer Price Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations, the OECD states corporate governance and regulation of the global
information economy as areas that present some of the biggest challenges.
TPM is often a reaction to government regulation. Regulation has not caught up
with the pace of the globalization of the production process. The OECD explicitly states
that governments should not view tax discrepancies, as a result of transfer price
differences, to necessarily be outright manipulation. This is because the multi-layered
structures of regulation make accounting a much more complex process. Though, the
OECD still cautions that this reasoning cannot be rationale to assume that some MNEs
are not engaging in illicit activities. Overall, transfer pricing cannot be regarded as an
exact science, making analyses and strategies like these all the more important.
The two main themes of the OECD standards are 1) a recognition of “separate
entities” and 2) the “arm’s length principle.” The former is a presupposition that
reinforces the arm’s length principle, which is really the heart of OECD standard. The
“separate entities” clause is found in Article 9 Paragraph 1 of the overall OECD Model
Tax Convention, and states
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“[Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two
[associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial
relations which differ from those which would be made
between independent enterprises, then any profits which
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the
enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so
accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise
and taxed accordingly.” (Organisation for Economic
Development and Co-operation, 2010, p. 33)
Though it may appear to have fairly vague language, it aims to simplify transfer pricing.
In setting transfer prices the separate parent and subsidiaries must treat each other as
though they are separate entities (aptly put) rather than members of a unified entity. The
simplification rests in the sense that regulators, accountants and auditors within the MNE,
are then able to focus
“on the nature of the transaction between the members and
on whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions
that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled
transactions” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 2010, p. 33).
This comparability is essential for successfully following the OECD guidelines because it
allows the MNE and government to accurately calculate tax liabilities. Price setting is
guided by the arm’s length principle that basically states that the gross market value for
the good is the governing price. In tandem with the separate entities clause, this should
streamline the process for setting appropriate taxes at each stage of the production
process, from extraction to selling.
Following OECD guidelines is one thing, but given the likely extent of TPM,
along with evidence from the Ernst & Young survey, there are bound to be disputes. It is
unlikely that a global court process for illicit flows such as these will be created, no
matter how easy of a fix that would be. Instead, there are certain steps that can be taken to
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address the problem judiciously, as well as respect the autonomy of sovereign states.
First, it is important to understand the burden-of-proof in tax disputes. Different countries
have different regulations considering burden-of-proof. Again, the OECD provides an
adequate model. According to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the same
Convention that lays out transfer pricing guidelines, it is important for countries to take a
position of good faith, and a “cooperative approach.” More specifically, it suggests that
states should request the necessary adjustments for discrepancies when it seems as though
the arm’s length principle has not been adhered to. Given the clandestine nature of TPM,
this is best because stating the burden-of-proof as in the hands of those that are
committing the crime simply does not make sense. At the same time, the role of private
companies is not to make sure that government is getting its due revenue, it is to create
and grow profits for shareholders and other stakeholders. The government’s role is to
maintain a functioning state for the well being of its citizens. Thus, the regulating and
policing role should squarely be in the hands of the state.
There also is a need for a proper penalty process. The treatment of penalties is
important because an uncooperative environment can create incentives for MNEs to
further engage in TPM. Penalties should be agreed upon between states a priori to the
offense so that it is clear what the consequences of being guilty of TPM. Furthermore,
states should consider entering into advanced pricing arrangements (APAs) in order to
agree to a terms of transfer pricing before any discrepancy can take place. This way, there
is a clear precedent to follow if arbitration and penalties take place. Article 25 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention suggests that arbitration of offenses should only occur if
adjustments have not been made from 2 years from the date of offense. Though,
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cooperation remains key because the actual “starting point” of the actual offense may be
opaque and must be agreed upon. Though, this depends on who the main actor in the
offense is. For SACU countries who have some sort of relatively independent regulation
in place (e.g. Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa), this will likely include points where
resources cross the border at customs, thus likely be in the hands of the MNEs. However,
with countries that lack relatively independent regulations (e.g. Namibia and Swaziland),
the point of origin in the offense may be far before the resources get to a customs station
and may likely involve political actors. Of course, within this simplification of the origin
of offenses, there are likely layers of relationships and operations that can also harbor the
illicit activity. This makes a clear definition of the point of origin imperative for
successful development of transfer pricing regulations.
Though is essential for confronting TPM, adhering to OECD guidelines not an
easy task. However, one does not need to be part of the OECD to sign on to guidelines;
according to the OECD, South Africa is the only SACU country that has done so.
Though, for the BLNS countries, signing on to this agreement is the one of the first tasks
to begin the process of taking transfer pricing seriously. There are often too many
vagaries in their pricing of extractive resources that makes any serious attempt to address
TPM moot. The most notable example of this is Swaziland, where the gross market price
for extractive resources is supposed to govern, but the Minister can change this at-will if
he or she disagrees (not to mention the legal status of the Swazi King to act as the
ultimate caretaker for state monies). The OECD guidelines for TPM are important
because MNE parent companies often originate in countries that are members of this
organization, or are on similar development levels; they should all be guided by either the
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same or similar principles. It can only serve as a tool for accountability and a
simplification of the process.
Officially agreeing and creating laws to conform to the OECD Model Tax
Convention should be a goal of each SACU country, though the SACU arrangement itself
should develop a dispute mechanism to take on arbitration of disputes within and any
transaction involving members states. Currently, paying adjustment penalties under the
OECD guidelines is explicitly “non-mandatory,” the SACU institution can make a clear
statement that TPM will not be tolerated if it reforms to state otherwise.
Addressing transfer pricing with the adequate laws are important, but this does
not take away the fact that the extractive resource sector is often fraught with corruption
and illicit activities. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is the most
well known international effort to demand transparency in this sector. It is
“a global effort to make natural resources benefit all; a
coalition of governments, companies, and civil society; and
a standard for companies to publish what they pay and for
governments to disclose what they receive.” (Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, 2009).
Currently no SACU countries are Compliant nor are they considered Candidate countries.
The first step to becoming a Compliant country is to publicly state willingness to begin
the process of determining status by the EITI. After this, the country must begin a public
process of appointing stakeholders within the different economic sectors and eventually
develop a strategic work plan to begin the process of implementation. Once this process
is approved, Candidate countries have two and a half years to begin implementation.
There are 15-requirements that must be completed to gain Compliant status; they are
broken down into broad categories that include:
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•

Preparation- The government is required to ensure the full participation of and
engagement with stakeholders from all sectors. The process for agreeing on
reporting templates must be agreed upon, and must comply with international
standards.

•

Disclosure- The government must ensure all companies disclose payments, as
well as disclose all of its own revenues, to stakeholders. A multi-stakeholder
group is created to ensure that these reports are accurate as well as to account for
any discrepancies.

•

Dissemination- The stakeholder group must prepare and make the disclosure
report publicly available and part of public debate.

•

Review and validation- Private company stakeholders must agree to the EITI
implementation. The government and stakeholder group must verify the findings
of the report and submit proper paperwork to EITI.

After the country has been validated as Compliant, its status is then reviewed every five
years to ensure that it is still following the guidelines for transparency. The complete
table specifying the 20-step process to gaining compliance is available in Appendix C.
Of course this process is much easier said than done. It requires a great deal of
political will on behalf of governments who may not have the capacity to implement the
requirements, or may even be corrupt themselves. Also, it requires active involvement on
behalf of companies in extractive resources that may be actively involved in illicit
financial flows, and therefore have little incentive to cooperate. Coordinating action
between sectors and stakeholders who may often be at odds with each other is a
monumental undertaking. Though, there are some signs of progress outside and
implementation of the standards from outside of the SACU region. A number of countries
have already become Compliant, and a number of African countries are actually at the
Candidate stage. Since TPM is a large global problem, it is advisable that both SACU
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countries and those countries who are home to parent companies to begin the process.
Between both these groups of countries, only the USA has publicly stated willingness.
Reforming SACU
Beginning the process of submitting to international standards is quite a large
task. Overall, to take these international standards seriously, creating regional policy
aimed towards TPM requires political commitment as well as increased deepening of the
SACU integration. The 2002 reforms of the agreement have widely expanded the
participation of all states and stakeholders within states into the institution itself. Despite
this, the broadening of the democratic space in SACU actually needs to be directed more
appropriately- particularly where they can be useful in regard to addressing TPM. One
obvious change is to address the lack of a Technical Liaison Committee for the natural
resources sector. These committees are important because they advise the institution on
pertinent issues in that area, which includes setting customs duties for certain goods.
Given that natural resources are such an important factor in SACU economies, having a
working committee for this sector should be one of the first priorities. Creating this
should also go in tandem with amending the 2002 agreement to relax customs targeting
restrictions in the natural resource sector because they are currently an exception.
It is also essential to complete the tribunal. A proper dispute resolution
mechanism is vital to the workings of these agreements because it allows for a process of
accountability and precedence. Arbitration of transfer pricing disputes is on the rise
globally, and though the OECD sets out guidelines for adjudicating disputes, they lack
the necessary teeth to implement regulations and penalties. SACU can be a leader in this
area.
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Given that TPM is a global crime that includes countries outside of the region, it
is suggested that SACU use these suggested mechanisms, along with those that already
exist, to continue and deepen the relationship amongst its members. It allows for a
cohesive and cooperative stance to combat an issue that involves much larger and,
oftentimes, powerful actors, and is in line with its goal to address trade external the
region in a more integrated way.
A Note on Corporate Social Responsibility
At times throughout this thesis it may seem as though private actors are sole
drivers of TPM; that the motive to increase profits and take advantage of countries with
weak capacity wrests with them. This thesis does not shy away from the notion that some
private MNEs are certainly complicit, but it should not be viewed as the only actor at
fault. As referenced through the neo-patrimonial state, sometimes state authorities at
various levels are complicit in illicit activities as well. Given the amount of capital and
influence that private MNEs have compared to developing countries, it is important to
address TPM from the perspective that responsibility rests with governments to control
and regulate these flows. However at the same time, there is much that can be said about
private companies being responsible for their own actions. Corporate social responsibility
(CSR) is an important aspect of corporate governance that many companies already take
seriously. Though CSR continues to grow in popularity as both a business practice and
marketing tool, transfer pricing rarely enters these strategies (Sikka & Willmott, 2010, p.
344). Private actors, who are primarily responsible to produce results for shareholders
and other stakeholders, must also view the success of their business to consumers and
larger society. They have a stake seeing growth and development because it expands the
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market for their products. A truly successful strategy for tackling tax evasion certainly
includes buy-in from private actors. Although the strategy and reforms outlined here do
not offer specifics for corporate reform, the EITI framework certainly includes
involvement on behalf of MNEs.
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Section Six: Conclusion
Challenges for the Future
Implementing the suggested strategy for SACU to address TPM will be a
monumental undertaking. It will likely take years, or even decades, and will likely need
additional changes in the future, as the global economy will surely continue to evolve as
well. One of the most significant challenges will be addressing changes in the natural
resource sector in general. Mineral resources are exhaustible, and therefore
nonrenewable. Even though SACU countries, and Africa in general, are arguably
“untapped” in some areas (USGS, 2011, 2012), the amount of mineral resources will
decline in the long-term. There will be significant consequences that will result in
structural changes of the SACU economies. These consequences may take two forms.
First, and more pessimistic, is the view that a decline in available extractive
minerals may create incentives for MNEs to act more aggressively as the resources for
their profits decline. Fewer resources may increase their profits as commodity prices
increase, and this can increase aggressive business motives. When this is coupled with
collusion from public officials who are attracted by the FDI, this can reinforce a nature of
illicitness. Even if steps to stymie TPM are put into place, the abuse of transfer prices
may return; if steps are not taken, the practice could only increase.
Second, and slightly less pessimistic, is the notion that in the long-term, as
mineral resources are depleted, there is less MNE involvement in the natural resource
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sector. This may act to shrink the space for a corrupt environment. Though, this line of
thinking must be taken with caution for SACU growth because of their current
dependence on the sector. This change may only be positive if the region, and countries
diversify their economies.
Regardless of its legal status, TPM is an illicit flow. Furthermore, it is likely a
significant problem in the natural resource extraction sector, given the existing nature of
corruption that is often present. The countries of the Southern African Customs Union are
largely dependent on natural resources, and likely lose much needed revenue from this
activity. Indications from South Africa, which happens to have the most sophisticated
legal network to regulate TPM, estimate a loss of almost $4 billion per year. This is a
significant development issue because it undermines state capacity to govern effectively,
as well as decreases amount of revenue that can be directed towards development.
Developing strategies to face this challenge are not easy. The SACU institution itself is
an ideal actor to drive this, but it requires reforms to increase institutional deepening, an
expansion of democratic representation for the natural resource sector, as well as a
regional judicial process within the union. To be taken seriously, it should also work
towards integrating to international standards on transfer pricing as well as encourage
member countries to being the process of EITI compliance for the resource sector.
Regardless of these challenges, the fact remains that TPM must be addressed. By
implementing the necessary regulations, the legal environment will be able to confront
any additional challenges on much stronger footing.
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Concluding Remarks
Laws are laws, but they are only as good as they are enforced. One of the main
issues that this thesis does not address adequately, because of both time and scope, is the
need to continue to develop effective government capacity. Transfer price manipulation
takes from tax revenues that can enhance development. Tackling this type of tax evasion
requires government capacity, so it is important that the strategy presented is taken
seriously. Though, it should be incorporated into a larger developmental strategy that
incorporates other areas for reform within issue areas.
It is important to bring all stakeholders to the table in facing these challenges.
Governments need to create the political willpower to see TPM as an issue that is
draining the state of money, private MNEs need to realize the important role they play in
development and see that it can create even more profits for them, and citizens need to
demand accountability and good practice from both public and private actors. The SACU
institution, including the individual member countries, has the opportunity to be leaders
in Africa and for the rest of the world on tackling transfer price manipulation. The global
nature of this illicit flow requires coordination between countries and sectors, but taking
the necessary steps to control this illicit flow can create positive results for all involved.
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Appendix A
Selected Results from 2010 Global Transfer Pricing Survey4
Importance of
Transfer
Pricing
Transfer
pricing is the
most
important tax
issue for their
group
Transfer
pricing
documentation
is more
important now
than it was
two years ago
Transfer
pricing policy
has been
examined by a
tax authority
in any country

Australia

Canada

China

Finland

France

Germany

Japan

India

Netherlands

South
Africa

Spain

Switzerland

United
Kingdom

United
States

36%

12%

30%

29%

28%

36%

33%

35%

16%

30%

19%

62%

24%

19%

40%

64%

70%

79%

92%

84%

83%

95%

72%

60%

100%

77%

67%

69%

68%

72%

20%

75%

88%

88%

53%

45%

80%

40%

75%

92%

82%

90%

. “Global Transfer Pricing Survey 2010: Top 6 Trends in Transfer Pricing.” http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/InternationalTax/2010-Global-Transfer-Pricing-Survey. Website accessed: March 2012.
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Importance of
Transfer
Pricing
Examinations
resulting in an
adjustment
(known
outcomes)
Transfer
pricing
documentation
viewed as
adequate upon
audit
Tax authority
threatened to
impose
penalties
Penalties were
imposed
(known
outcomes)
Intercompany
financing
transactions
have
undergone
review

Australia

Canada

China

Finland

France

Germany

Japan

India

Netherlands

South
Africa

Spain

Switzerland

United
Kingdom

United
States

18%

17%

100%

12%

75%

37%

32%

44%

53%

0%

18%

52%

20%

25%

65%

72%

100%

65%

50%

86%

38%

89%

79%

50%

64%

65%

50%

72%

33%

33%

0%

33%

25%

27%

29%

60%

45%

NA

33%

33%

48%

33%

0%

0%

0%

67%

44%

0%

29%

20%

36%

NA

33%

7%

4%

17%

53%

44%

100%

59%

20%

55%

0%

89%

74%

36%

57%

43%

19%

76

75%

Importance of
Transfer
Pricing
Highest
priority in
driving
transfer
pricing
strategy is tax
risk
management
Transfer
pricing
documentation
is prepared
concurrently,
on a globally
coordinated
basis

Australia

Canada

China

Finland

France

Germany

Japan

India

Netherlands

South
Africa

Spain

Switzerland

United
Kingdom

United
States

68%

28%

60%

50%

52%

40%

73%

45%

68%

60%

50%

35%

51%

54%

48%

48%

10%

54%

44%

48%

7%

40%

48%

40%

38%

73%

47%

38%
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Appendix B
Structure of the Mineral Industries5 and Location of Owner/s
Country

Botswana

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Clay

Lobatse Clay Works (Pty.) Ltd. (Botswana Development
Corp. and Interklin Corp joint venture)

Lobatse, 70 kilometers
south- southwest of
Gabarone

Gabarone, Botswana; Houston, USA

Makoro Brick and Tile (Pty.) Ltd.

Makoro, 10 kilometers
south of Palapye

Botswana

Coal

Morupule Colliery (Pty) Ltd. (Anglo American Corp. of
South Africa Ltd. And related firms, 93.3%)

Morupule, 270 kilometers
northwest of Gabarone

London, UK

Diamond

Debswana Diamond Co. (Pty.) Ltd. (Government, 50%,
and De Beers Centenary AG, 50%)

Jwaneng Mine, 115
kilometers west of
Gabarone

Luxembourg, Luxembourg

do.6

Orapa Mine, 375 kilometers
north of Gabarone

do.

5

United States Geological Survey Minerals Information. Mineral Yearbook Vol. III: Area Reports International 2009 and 2010.
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/myb.html. Accessed: March 2012.
6

Do. = ditto
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Country

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

do.

Letlhakane Mine, 350
kilometers north of
Gabarone

do.

do.

Damtshaa Mine, 220
kilometers west of
Francistowh

do.

Tswapong Mining Co. (Pty.) Ltd. (De Beers Prospecting
Botswana Ltd., 85% and Government, 15%)

Tswapong Mine, 275
kilometers northeast of
Gabarone

Luxembourg, Luxembourg

Gemstones,
seimprecious

Agate Botswana (Pty.) Ltd.

Processing plant at Pilane,
45 kilometers north of
Gabarone

Botswana; United Kingdom

Gold

IAMGOLD Corp.

Mupane Mine, near
Francistown

Toronto, Canada

Nickel-coppercobalt

Bamangwato Concessions Ltd. (BCL), (Government,
15%, and Botswana RST Ltd., 85%, of which LionOre
Mining International Ltd., 12.65%)

Selebi-Phikwe Mines, 350
kilometers northeast of
Gabarone

Botswana; Toronto, Canada

Tati Nickel Mining Co. (Pty.) Ltd. (LionOre Mining
International Ltd., 85% and Government, 15%)

Phoenix and Selkirk Mines,
23 kilometers east of
Francistown

Toronto, Canada

Masa Precious Stones (Pty.) Ltd.

Bobonong, east of SelebiPhikwe

Botswana

Salt
Soda ash

Botswana Ash (Pty.) Ltd. (Government, 50%, and Anglo
American plc, 50%)
do.

Sua Pan, 450 kilometers
north of Gabarone
do.

London, UK
do.

Diamond

Gem Diamond Ltd., 70%, and Government 30%

Letseng Mine, northern
Lesotho

London, UK

Commodity

Botswana
(cont’d)

Lesotho
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Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Lesotho
(cont’d)

Liqhobong Mining Development Co. (Kopane Diamond
Developments plc, 75%, and Government, 25%)

Liqhobong Mine, northern
Lesotho

London, UK

Namibia

Ohorongo Cement (Pty) Ltd. (Schwenk Zement KG, 60%;
Industrial Development Corp., 20%; Development Bank
of Namibia, 10%)

Otjozondjupa region, near
Otavi

Ulm, Germany; South Africa;
Namibia

Weatherly Mining Namibia Ltd. (Weatherly International
plc, 100%)

Central operations, includes
the Otjihase Mine and
concentrator, about 30
kilometers north of
Windhoek; and the
Matchless Mine, 80
kilometers southwest of the
Otjihase Mine

London, UK

do.

Northern operations,
includes the Tschudi and
the Tsumeb West Mines,
and the Tsumeb
concentrator

do.

do.

Kombat operations,
includes Kombat Mine and
concentrator, 440
kilometers north of
Windhoek

do.

Namibia Custom Smelters (Pty.) Ltd. (Dundee Precious
Metals Inc., 100%)

Smelter at Tsumeb

Toronto, Canada

Country

Commodity

Cement
Copper:

Copper
concentrates

Metal, blister
copper

80

Country

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Namibia
(cont’d)

Diamond

De Beers Marine Namibia [De Beers Société Anonyme,
70% and Namdeb Diamond Corporation (Pty.) Ltd., 30%
Diaz Exploration (Pty.) Ltd.

Atlanta 1 license area,
offshore Sperrgebiet
Offshore operation

Switzerland; London; UK;
Luxembourg, Luxembourg;
Namibia

Joint venture of Diamond Fields (Pty.) Ltd. (Diamond
Fields International Ltd., 100%) and Bonaparte Dimaond
Mines NL

Mining License 111,
offshore Luderitz

West Perth, Australia; Vancouver,
Canada

Namdeb Diamond Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. (Government,
50%, and De Beers Société Anonyme, 50%)

Mining Area 1, from
Orange River to 145
kilometers north of
Orangemund;includes
Pocket Beaches

Luxembourg, Luxembourg

do.

Northern Areas and
Elizabeth Bay Mines,24
kilometers south of
Luderitz

do.

do.

Orange River Mines, from
mouth of Orange River east
to Sendelingsdrif; includes
the Auchas and the Daberas
Mines

do.

do.

Beach and marine
contractors

do.

Sakawe Mining Corp. (Samicor) (LL Mining Corp., 76%,
and Government, 8%)

Offshore mining licenses,
near Luderitz Bay

Israel

Okorusu Fluorspar (Pty.) Ltd. (Solvay Fluor GmbH,
100%)

Mine and plant at Okorusu

Hannover, Germany

Fluorspar, acid
grade
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Country
Nambia
(cont’d)

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

AngloGold Ashanti Namibia (Pty.) Ltd.

Navachab Mine, 170
kilometers northwest of
Windhoek

London, UK; Johannesburg, South
Africa

Gold metal

Namibia Custom Smelters (Pty.) Ltd. (Dundee Precious
Metals Inc., 100%)

Coproduct contained in
blister copper produced at
the copper smelter at
Tsumeb

Toronto, Canada

Lead, Pb
content of
concentrate

Rosh Pinah Zinc Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. [Exxaro
Resources Ltd., 50.04%; Jaguar Investments Holdings,
38.98%; PE Minerals (Namibia) (Pty.) Ltd., 8%]

Rosh Pinah Mine, near
Rosh Pinah

Pretoria, South Africa; Sydney,
Australia; Namibia

Pyrite,
concentrate
Salt:

Weatherly Mining Namibia Ltd. (Weatherly International
plc, 100%)
Cape Cross Salt (Pty.) Ltd.

Otjihase Mine and
concentrator, near Tsumeb
North of Henties Bay

London, UK
Namibia

Salt & Chemicals (Pty.) Ltd. [Walvis Bay Salt Holdings
(Pty.) Ltd., 100%]
Salt Company (Pty.) Ltd.

Salt pan at Walvis Bay
Swakopmund

South Africa
Brisbane, Australia

Walvis Bay Salt Refiners (Pty.) Ltd. [Walvis Bay Salt
Holdings (Pty.) Ltd., 100%]

Salt refinery at Walvis Bay

South Africa

Rosh Pinah Zinc Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. [Exxaro
Resources Ltd., 50.04%;, Jaguar Investments Holdings,
38.98%; PE Minerals (Namibia) (Pty.) Ltd., 8%]

Rosh Pinah Mine, near
Rosh Pinah

Pretoria, South Africa; Sydney,
Australia; Namibia

Commodity

Gold ore

Silver:

Concentrate,
Ag content
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Country

Namibia
(cont’d)

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Metal

Namibia Custom Smelters (Pty.) Ltd. (Dundee Precious
Metals Inc., 100%)

Coproduct contained in
blister copper produced at
the copper smelter at
Tsumeb

Toronto, Canada

Uranium,
uranium oxide

Langer Heinrich Uranium (Pty.) Ltd. (Paladin Energy
Ltd., 100%)

Langer Heinrich Mine. 80
kilometers east of Walvis
Bay

Subiaco, Australia

Rössing Uranium Ltd. (Rio Tinto Group, 69%;
Government of Iran, 15%; Industrial Development Corp.
of South Africa Ltd., 10%; Government of Namibia, 3%;
other minority shareholders, 3%)
Namibia Mineral Development Co. (Pty.) Ltd.

Rössing Mine, 65
kilometers northeast of
Swakopmund
Usakos Mine

London, UK; Melbourne, Australia;
South Africa; Iran
Windhoek, Namibia

Concentrate,
Zn content

Rosh Pinah Zinc Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. [Exxaro
Resources Ltd., 50.04%; Jaguar Investments Holdings,
38.98%; PE Minerals (Namibia) (Pty.) Ltd., 8%]

Rosh Pinah Mine, near
Rosh Pinah

Pretoria, South Africa; Sydney,
Australia; Namibia

Ore

Skorpion Mining Co. (Pty.) Ltd. (Vedanta Resources plc,
100%)

Skorpion Mine, 25
kilometers north of Rosh
Pinah

London, UK

Metal

Namzinc (Pty.) Ltd. (Vedanta Resources plc, 100%)

Skorpion solvent extraction
facilities and
electrowinning refinery, 25
kilometers north of Rosh
Pinah

London, UK

Aluminum

BHP Billiton Ltd.

Hillside smelter at Richards
Bay

London, UK; Melbourne, Australia

Commodity

Wollastonite
Zinc:

South
Africa
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Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Andalusite

Antimony

Cement

Chromite

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

do.

Bayside smelter at Richards
Bay

do.

Imerys Group
do.
do.

Thabazimbi Mine near
Thabazimbi
Annesley Mine at Penge
Havercroft Mine at Penge

France
do.
do.

do.

Krugerspost Mine, near
Lydenburg

do.

Andalusite Resources (Pty) Ltd. [African Mineral Trading
and Exploration (Pty) Ltd.]

Maroeloesfontein, near
Thabazimbi, Northern
Province

Johannesburg, South Africa

Consolidated Murchison Ltd. (Metorex Pty. Ltd., 100%)

Consolidated Murchison
Mine near Gravelotte

Gansu, China

Pretoria Portland Cement Co. (Pty) Ltd. (Barloworld
Trust Co. Ltd., 68%)
Alpha Ltd. [AfriSam Consortium (Pty) Ltd., 48.5%]

De Hoek, Dwaalboom,
Hercules, Jupiter, Port
Elizabeth, Riebeeck, and
Slurry plants
Dudfield and Ulco plants

Johannesburg, South Africa
South Africa; Switzerland

Lafarge South Africa Ltd. (Lafarge S.A.)

Lichtenburg plant in North
West Province

Paris, France

Natal Portland Cement Co. (Pty) Ltd. (Cimentos de
Portugal SGPS, S.A., 98%)

Simumu plant

Lisbon, Portugal

Xstrata plc, 79.5%, and Merafe Resources Ltd., 20.5%

Boshoek Mine at Boshoek2

Zug, Switzerland; London, UK;
Johannesburg, South Africa

do.

Kroondal Mine at
Rustenburg

do.
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Country
South
Africa
(Cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

do.

Thorncliffe Mine at
Steelpoort

do.

do.

Helena Mine at Steelpoort

do.

2

do.

Waterval Mine

do.

Horizon Mine at Pilansberg

do.

Samancor Chrome Ltd. (Kermas Group Ltd., 100%)

Eastern Chrome Mines in
Steelpoort Valley,
Mpumalanga Province

United Kingdom

do.
International Ferro Metals Ltd.

Western Chrome Mines in
Northern Province2
Buffelsfontein Mine

do.
Sydney, Australia

Nkomati Joint Venture (African Rainbow Minerals Ltd.,
50%, and OJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel, 50%)

Nkomati Chrome Mine in
Mpumalanga Province

Johannesburg, South Africa;
Moscow, Russia

Assmang Ltd. (African Rainbow Minerals Ltd., 50%, and
Assore Ltd., 50%)
Bayer (Pty) Ltd.

Dwarsrivier Mine in
Mpumalanga Province
Rustenburg Chrome Mine

Johannesburg, South Africa
Kempton Park, South Africa

Dilokong Chrome Mine (Pty) Ltd. [ASA Metals (Pty)
Ltd., 100%]

Dilokong Mine, near
Burgersfort in Mpumalanga
Province

China; South Africa

National Manganese Mines (Pty) Ltd.

Buffelsfontein Mine at
Mooinooi

Parklands, South Africa
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do.

Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Anglo Coal Ltd. (Anglo American plc, 100%)
Exxaro Resources Ltd. (BEE Holdco, 52.3%)

Location of main facilities
Goedehoop, Greenside,
Isibonelo, Kleinkopje,Kriel,
Landau, Mafube, New
Denmark, New Vaal and
Nooitgedacht Mines
Grootegeluk Mine in
Limpopo Province

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

London, UK
South Africa

do.

Matla Mine in Mpumalanga
Province
Arnot Mine in Mpumalanga
Province

do.

North Block Mine in
Mpumalanga Province

do.

do.
do.

Leeuwpan Mine in
Mpumalanga Province
Inyanda Mine

do.
do.

do.

New Clydesdale Mine in
Mpumalanga Province

do.

Tshikondeni Mine in
Limpopo Province

do.

Mafube Mine
Syferfontein Mine
Brandspruit Mine
Middelbult Mine
Bosjesspruit Mine

London, UK; Pretoria, South Africa
Johannesburg, South Africa
do.
do.
do.

do.

do.
Anglo American plc, 50%, and Exxaro Resources Ltd.,
50%
Sasol Ltd.
do.
do.
do.
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do.
do.

Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

do.
do.

Twistdraai Mine
Mooikraal Mine

do.
do.

BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd., 84%, and
Xstrata plc, 16%

Middelburg Mine

London, UK; Melbourne, Australia;
Zug, Switzerland

BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd.

Khutala underground mine

London, UK; Melbourne, Australia

BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd., 84%, and
Xstrata plc, 16%
BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd.

do.
Optimum Coal Holdings (Pty) Ltd
do.

Douglas Mine
Klipspruit Mine
Goedgevonden Mine at
Witbank
Tweefontein Division
(Boschmans, South
Witbank, Waterpan, and
Witcons Mines) at Witbank
iMpunzi Division (Phoenix
and Tavistock Mines) at
Witbank
Southstock Division at
Witbank
Mpumalanga Division
(Spitzkop and Tselentis
Mines) at Breyten and
Ermelo
Optimum Mine
Koornfontein Mines

Shanduka Coal (Pty) Ltd. (Glencore International AG,
70%, and Shanduka Resources (Pty) Ltd., 30%)
Coal of Africa Ltd.

Bankfontein, Graspan,
Lakeside, Leeuwfontein,
and Townlands Mines
Mooiplaats Mine

Xstrata plc, 74%

Xstrata plc, 79.8%
do.
do.
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London, UK; Melbourne, Australia;
Zug, Switzerland
London, UK; Melbourne, Australia
London, UK; Zug, Switzerland

London, UK; Zug, Switzerland
do.
do.

do.
Johannesburg, South Africa
do.
Baar, Switzerland; St. Hellier,
Jersey; Johannesburg, South Africa
South Africa

Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Copper

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Kangra Group Pty. Ltd. [Shanduka Resources (Pty) Ltd.,
30%]
Stuart Coal Group
NuCoal Mining (Pty) Ltd.

Savmore and Welgedacht
Mines
Stuart Colliery
Woestalleen Mine

Johannesburg, South Africa
Kempton Park, South Africa
Newcastle, Australia

Total Coal SA (Pty) Ltd.
do.

Forzando North and
Forzando South Mines
Dorsfontein Mine

France
do.

Palabora Mining Co. Ltd. (Rio Tinto Ltd., 57%, and
Anglo American plc, 29%)
do.
do.

Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd. (Anglo American
plc, 74.1%)
do.
Black Mountain Mineral Development Co. (Pty) Ltd.
(Anglo American plc, 74%)
Diamond

De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. (Anglo American plc,
29%)

Palabora Mines at
Phalaborwa
Smelter at Phalaborwa
Refinery at Phalaborwa
Amandebult, Rustenburg,
and Union sections; and
Bafokeng Rasimone,
Lebowa, Modikwa,
Potgietersrust, and Western
Limb Mines
Rustenburg Base Metal
Refiners
Black Mountain Mine near
Aggeneys in Northern Cape
Province

do.

Venetia Mine in Northern
Province
Finsch Mine, 100
kilometers west of
Kimberley

do.

Kimberley surface mines,
Kimberley
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London, UK; Melbourne, Australia
do.
do.

London, UK
do.
London, UK
London, UK
do.
do.

Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

do.

Namaqualand Mine near
Kleinzee
Voorspoed Mine
South Africa Sea Areas
Cullinan Mine
Helam, Sedibeng, and Star
Mines

do.

Koffiefontein Mine in Free
State Province

do.
do.
do.
Petra Diamonds Ltd.

do.

Fluorspar

Location of main facilities

Trans Hex Group Ltd.
Witkop Fluorspar Mine (Pty) Ltd. (subsidiary of Sallies
Ltd.)

Kimberley underground
mines, Kimberley2
Baken, Bloeddrif, Reuning,
and Saxendrift Mines

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)
do.
do.
do.
Jersey
do.
do.
do.
Cape Town, South Africa

do.

Witkop Mine at Zeerust2
Buffalo Mine at
Mookgopong2

Vergenoeg Mining Corp. (Pty) Ltd. [Minerales Y
Productos Derivados SA (Minersa), 85%]

Vergenoeg Mine at Rust de
Winter

Spain

AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. (Anglo American plc, 41.8%)
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.

Vaal River operations:
Kopanang Mine
do.
Great Noligwa Mine
do.
Tau Lekoa Mine
do.
Moab Khotsong Mine

London, UK
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.

Pretoria, South Africa
do.

Gold:
Mine
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Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

do.

do.
West Wits operations: Tau
Tona Mine
do.
Savuka Mine
do.
Mponeng Mine
do.
Kloof Mine
do.
Driefontein Mine
do.
Beatrix Mine
do.
South Deep Mine
do.
Bambanani, Masimong,
Phakisa, and Tshepong
Mines
do.
Evander operations
do.
Elandsrand Mines
do.
Virginia Mine
do.
Target Mine

do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
Gold Fields Ltd.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
Harmony Gold Mining Co. Ltd.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
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Location of Owners
(Parent Company)
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
Johannesburg, South Africa
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
Melrose Arch, South Africa
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.

Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
DRDGold Ltd.
do.
do.
do.

do.
Kalgold Mine
do.
Doornkop Mine
do.
Blyvooruitzicht Mine
do.
Crown Mine
do.

do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
Roodeport, South Africa
do.
do.
do.

do.
do.
First Uranium Corp.

East Rand Proprietary Mine
Ergo Mine
Ezulwini Mine

do.
do.
Toronto, Canada

Central Rand Gold Ltd.

Mine Waste Solutions
Project (MWS)
Modder East Mine
Buffelsfontein Mine
Transvaal Gold Mining
Estate (TGME)
Eastern Transvaal
Consolidated Division
(Fairview, New Consort,
and Sheba Mines)
Central Rand Goldfield
near Johannesburg

Rand Refinery Ltd. (AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., 53%, and
Gold Fields Ltd., 33%)

Germiston, Gauteng
Province

London, UK; Johannesburg, South
Africa

Kumba Iron Ore Ltd.

Sishen Mine at Sishen

London, UK

do.
Gold One International Ltd.
Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd.
do.
Barberton Mines Ltd. [Metorex Ltd., 54%, and Shanduka
Resources (Pty) Ltd., 26%]

Refined
Iron and steel:
Iron ore
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do.
Australia
Rivonia, South Africa
do.
Gansu, China; Johannesburg, South
Africa
Roodeport, South Africa

Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

do.

Thabazimbi Mine at
Thabazimbi
Khumani Mine
Beeshoek Mine near
Postmasburg

Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Ltd. (Ervaz Group
S.A., 79%)
Xstrata plc

Mapochs Mine at
Roossenekal
Rhovan Mine at Brits

Vametco Minerals Corp. (Ervaz Group S.A., 81%)

Krokodilkraal Mine and
plant near Brits

Xstrata plc, 79.5%, and Merafe Resources Ltd., 20.5%
do.

Wonderkop
Rustenburg

Xstrata plc, 69.6%, and Merafe Resources Ltd., 30.4%

Lydenburg

Xstrata plc, 79.5%, and Merafe Resources Ltd., 20.5%
do.

Lion plant at Steelpoort
Boshoek

London, UK
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK;
Johannesburg, South Africa
do.
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK;
Johannesburg, South Africa
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK;
Johannesburg, South Africa
do.

Samancor Chrome Division (Kermas Group Ltd., 100%)
Hernic Ferrochrome (Pty) Ltd. (Mitsubishi Corp., 51%)

Plants at Middelburg,
Steelpoort, and Witbank
Plant at Brits

United Kingdom
Tokyo, Japan

ASA Metals (Pty) Ltd. (Sinosteel, 60%, and Limpopo
Economic Development Enterprise, 40%)

Plant near Pietersburg,
Northern Province

China; South Africa

Assmang Ltd.

Machadodorp plant in
Mpumalanga Province

Johannesburg, South Africa

International Ferro Metals Ltd.
Tata Steel Ltd.

Plant in North West
Province
Richards Bay

Sydney, Australia
India

do.
Assmang Ltd.

Ferroalloys

Location of main facilities
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do.
South Africa
do.
London, UK
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK

Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Samancor Manganese (Pty) Ltd. (BHP Billiton Ltd., 60%,
and Anglo American plc, 40%)

Plant at Meyerton

London, UK; Melbourne, Australia

Assmang Ltd.

Cato Ridge plant in
KwaZulu Natal Province

Johannesburg, South Africa

Advalloy (Pty) Ltd. [Samancor Manganese (Pty) Ltd.,
100%]
Renova Group
do.
Silicon Technology Pty Ltd.
Grupo Ferroatlantica
Vanchem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd.
Xstrata plc
Vametco Minerals Corp.
Ruukki Group Oyj
ArcelorMittal South Africa Ltd.
do.
do.
do.
Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Ltd.

Cape Town Iron & Steel Works (Pty) Ltd.

Furnace at Samancor's
Meyerton plant
Plant at Witbank
do.
NA
Rand Carbide plant
Plant at Witbank
Rhovan plant at Brits
Smelter near Brits
Mogale plant
Vanderbijlpark plant
Newcastle plant
Saldanha plant
Vereeniging plant
Witbank
Stainless steel plant at
Middelburg
Germiston plant,
Johannesburg
Vanderbijlpark plant,
Gauteng
Kuilsrivier plant, Cape
Town

Duferco Steel Processing Ltd.

Cold-rolled slab steel plant
at Saldanha Bay

Columbus Stainless (Pty) Ltd. (Acerinox SA, 76%)
Scaw Metals Group (Anglo American plc)
Davsteel Division (Cape Gate Pty. Ltd.)
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London, UK; Melbourne, Australia;
South Africa
Russia
do.
Newcastle, South Africa
Madrid, Spain
Emalahleni, South Africa
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK
London, UK
Finland
Luxembourg; London, UK
do.
do.
do.
South Africa
Madrid, Spain
London, UK
South Africa
South Africa
Saldanha, South Africa

Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Lead

Black Mountain Mineral Development Co. (Pty) Ltd.

Black Mountain Mine near
Aggeneys in Northern Cape
Province

Johannesburg, South Africa

Lime

PPC Lime Ltd (subsidiary of Pretoria Portland Cement
Company Ltd.)
Idwala Lime (Idwala Industrial Holdings)

Plant at Lime Acres
Plant at Daniëlskuil

South Africa
South Africa

Commodity

Inca Lime (Pty) Ltd. [subsidiary of Inca Mining (Pty)
Ltd.]
Manganese

Assmang Ltd.
do.
Samancor Manganese (Pty) Ltd.
Renova Group
Metmin (Metorex Pty. Ltd., 100%)
Manganese Metal Co. Pty. Ltd. [Samancor Manganese
(Pty) Ltd., 51%]

Nickel

Plant at Immerpan,
Limpopo Province
Nchwaning Mine near
Black Rock
Gloria Mine near Black
Rock
Mamatwan and Wessels
Mines near Hotazel in
Northern Cape Province
Kalahari Mine
Open pit mine in North
West Province

do.

Electrolytic plant at
Nelspruit
Amandebult, Rustenburg,
and Union sections; and
Bafokeng Rasimone,
Lebowa, Modikwa,
Potgietersrust, and Western
Limb Mines
Rustenburg Base Metal
Refiners

Impala Platinum Ltd.

Impala Mines

Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd.
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Hampshire, UK
Johannesburg, South Africa
do.
United Kingdom
Russia
Gansu, China
United Kingdom

London, UK
do.
Netherlands

Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Nitrogen,
ammonia
Petroleum:
Crude

Refined

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

do.
do.

Impala Refining Services
Base Metals Refinery

do.
do.

Lonmin plc
do.

Marikana Mines (Eastern
Platinum, Karee, and
Western Platinum) near
Rustenburg and Limpopo
Mine
Base Metals Refinery

London, UK
do.

Nkomati Joint Venture

Nkomati Mine in
Mpumalanga Province

Moscow, Russia; Johannesburg,
South Africa

Sasol Ltd.

Plants at Sasolburg and
Secunda

Johannesburg, South Africa

Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa, 55%,
and Pioneer Natural Resources Co., 45%

Pioneer offshore field

Cape Town, South Africa; Dallas,
USA

Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa
do.

Oribi field, 140 kilometers
southwest offshore from
Mossel Bay
Oryx field

Cape Town, South Africa
do.

Shell and BP Refineries Pty. Ltd. (Shell SA Energy, 50%,
and BP Southern Africa, 50%)
Engen Ltd. (62%)

Sapref refinery in Durban
Engen refinery in Durban

The Hague, Netherlands; London,
UK
Cape Town, South Africa

National Petroleum Refiners of South Africa Pty. Ltd.
(Sasol Ltd., 63.6%)

Natref refinery in Sasolburg

Johannesburg, South Africa

Caltex Oil SA Pty. Ltd. (private, 100%)

Calref refinery in Cape
Town

NA
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Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Phosphate
rock

Phosphate Development Corp. Ltd. (Foskor Ltd.)
(Industrial Development Corp., 100%)
Fer-Min-Ore Ltd.
do.

Foskor Mine and plant at
Phalaborwa
Plant at Germiston
Plant at Isithebe

South Africa
South Africa
do.

Sasol Ltd.

Plant at Phalaborwa

Johannesburg, South Africa

Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd.
do.

Bathopele, Khomanani,
Khuseleka, Siphumelele
and Thembelani Mines
do.

London, UK
do.

Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd.
do.
Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd., 85%
do.

Dishaba and Tumela Mines
at Northam
do.
Union Mine at Swartklip
do.

London, UK
do.
London, UK
do.

Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine (Royal Bafokeng
Nation, 67%, and Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd.,
33%)
do.

Bafokeng Rasimone
Platinum Mine at Rasimone
do.

South Africa; London, UK
do.

Kroondal Platinum Mines (Anglo American Platinum
Corp. Ltd., 50%, and Aquarius Platinum Ltd., 50%)

Kroondal Mine

London, UK; Netherlands; Australia

Modikwa Platinum Mine (Anglo American Platinum
Corp. Ltd., 50%, and African Rainbow Minerals, 50%)
do.

Modikwa Mine at
Makgemeng
do.

London, UK; Johannesburg, South
Africa
do.

Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd.
do.

Mogalakwena Mine at GaMasenya
do.

London, UK
do.

Phosphoric
acid
Platinumgroup metals
Platinumgroup
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Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

do.
do.

Mototolo Mine at
Steelpoort
do.

do.
do.

do.

Polokwane smelter at
Polokwane

do.

do.
do.

Mortimer smelter at
Swartklip
Waterval smelter

do.
do.

do.
do.

Mortimer, Polokwante, and
Waterval smelters
Precious Metals Refinery

do.
do.

Impala Platinum Ltd. (Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd.,
100%)
do.
Impala Platinum Ltd.
do.
do.
do.
do.

Impala Mines, near
Phokeng in North West
Province
do.
Marula Mine at Bothashoek
do.
Smelter near Phokeng
Smelter near Springs
Refinery near Phokeng

Netherlands
do.
Netherlands
do.
do.
do.
do.

Impala Platinum Ltd.

Precious metals refinery,
near Springs in Guateng
Province

Netherlands

Lonmin plc
do.

Marikana Mines near
Maroelakop
do.

London, UK
do.

do.

Precious Metals Refinery at
Western Platinum

do.

97

Country

Commodity

South
Africa
(cont’d)

Pyrophyllite

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Northam Platinum Ltd. (Anglo American Platinum Corp.
Ltd., 22.5%, and Mvelaphanda Resources Ltd., 21.9%)
do.

Zondereinde Mine near
Northam
do.

London, UK; Johannesburg, South
Africa
do.

Marikana Platinum Mine (Anglo American Platinum
Corp. Ltd., 50%, and Aquarius Platinum Ltd., 50%)
do.

Marikana Mine
do.

London, UK; Netherlands; Australia
do.

Everest Platinum Mine (Aquarius Platinum Ltd., 50.5%,
and Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., 20%)
Aquarius Platinum Ltd.
Platmin Ltd.
Xstrata plc, 74%

Everest Platinum Mine at
Lydenburg2
Blue Ridge Mine
Pilanesberg Mine
Eland Mine

Netherlands; Australia
Netherlands; Australia
Centurion, South Africa
London, UK

Anooraq Resources Corp., 51%; Anglo American
Platinum Ltd., 49%
do.

Bokoni Mine at Sefateng
do.

Johannesburg, South Africa;
London, UK
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK

Two Rivers Platinum Mine (Pty) Ltd. (African Rainbow
Minerals Ltd., 55%, and Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd.,
45%)
do.

Two Rivers Platinum Mine
near Steelpoort
do.

Johannesburg, South Africa;
Netherlands
do.

Eastern Platinum Ltd. (Eastplats)
Platinum Australia Pty Ltd. (PLA)

Crocodile River Mine at
Arbourfell
Smokey Hills Mine

Vancouver, Canada
West Perth, Australia

Idwala Industrial Minerals (Benoni)

Ottsdal Mine in North West
Province

South Africa

Wonderstone Ltd. (The Associated Ore & Metals Corp.
Ltd.)
G&W Base and Industrial Minerals Pty. Ltd.

Pyrophylite (wonderstone)
mine,
Piet Retief Mine

Johannesburg, South Africa
South Africa
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Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Silicon

Grupo Ferroatlantica

Polokwane plant, near
Pietersburg

Madrid, Spain

Silver

Rand Refinery Ltd.

Germiston, Gauteng
Province

Singapore

Sulfur

Sasol Ltd.

Plants at Sasolburg and
Secunda

Johannesburg, South Africa

Synthetic fuels

Sasol Ltd.

Coal to oil plant at Secunda

Johannesburg, South Africa

Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa

Natural gas to petroleum
products plant at Mossel
Bay

Cape Town, South Africa

Richards Bay Minerals (BHP Billiton Ltd., 37%; Rio
Tinto plc, 37%; Blue Horizon Investments, 24%)

Open cast operations, near
Richards Bay

London, UK; Melbourne, Australia;
Tempe, USA

Exxaro Resources Ltd.

Mine near Brand-se-Baai
and mineral separation
plant at Koekenaap

Pretoria, South Africa

do.
Richards Bay Minerals (RBM)

KZN Sands Mine near
Richards Bay
Smelter at Richards Bay

do.
London, UK

Namakwa Sands Ltd.
Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Ltd.

Smelter at Vredenberg,
Saldanha Bay area
Steel plant at Witbank

Pretoria, South Africa
London, UK

Exxaro Resources Ltd.

Empangeni smelter near
Richards Bay

Pretoria, South Africa

AngloGold Ashanti Ltd.
First Uranium Corp.

Vaal Rivers operation, near
Klerksdorp
Ezulwini Mine

London, UK; Johannesburg, South
Africa
Toronto, Canada

Titanium:
Titanium
concentrates

Titanium slag

Uranium oxide
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South
Africa
(cont’d)

Commodity

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

Vanadium
pentoxide

Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Ltd. (Ervaz Group
S.A., 79%)
do.
Xstrata plc

Mapochs Mine near
Lydenburg
Plant at Witbank
Rhovan Mine at Brits

London, UK
do.
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK

Vametco Minerals Corp.

Krokodilkraal Mine and
plant near Brits

London, UK

Vanchem Vanadium Products Pty Ltd.

Wapadskloof Mine and
plant, 60 kilometers
northeast of Middelburg

Emalahleni, South Africa

Vermiculite

Palabora Mining Co. Ltd.

Palabora Mine and plant at
Phalaborwa

London, UK

Zinc

Zinc Corp. of South Africa Ltd. (Exxaro Resources Ltd.,
100%)

Struisbult Springszinc
refinery at Springs,
southeast of Johannesburg

Pretoria, South Africa

Black Mountain Mineral Development Co. (Pty) Ltd.

Black Mountain Mine near
Aggeneys in Northern Cape
Province

London, UK

Richards Bay Minerals (RBM)

Open cast mines near
Richards Bay

London, UK

Namakwa Sands Ltd.

Mine near Brand-se-Baai
and mineral separation
plant at Koekenaap

Pretoria, South Africa

Exxaro Resources Ltd.

Hillendale Mine near
Richards Bay, KwaZulu
Natal Province

Pretoria, South Africa

Palabora Mining Co. Ltd.

Palabora Mine and plant at
Phalaborwa

London, UK

Zirconium
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Country
South
Africa
(cont’d)

Swaziland

Major operating companies and major equity owners

Location of main facilities

Location of Owners
(Parent Company)

do.

Zirconium sulfate plant at
Phalaborwa

do.

Coal

Phosphate Development Corp. Ltd. (Foskor Ltd.)
(Industrial Development Corp., 100%)
do.
Maloma Colliery Ltd.

Plant at Phalaborwa
Fused zirconia plant
Maloma Mine at Maloma

South Africa
do.
South Africa

Ferrovanadium

Swazi Vanadium (Pty) Ltd. (Xstrata plc, 75%, and Tibiyo
Taka Ngwana, 25%)

Plant at Maloma

Zug, Switzerland; London, UK

Commodity
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Appendix C
Requirements for EITI Implementing Countries7
EITI Candidate

EITI Compliant

In order to apply for EITI Candidacy:

Before the end of the EITI Candidacy Period

Sign-Up Requirements

Preparation Requirements

1) The government is required to issue an
unequivocal public statement of its intention to
implement the EITI
2) The government is required to commit to work
with civil society and companies on the
implementation of the EITI
3) The government is required to appoint a senior
individual to lead on the implementation of the EITI
4) The Government is required to establish a multistakeholder group to oversee the implementation of
the EITI
5) The multistakeholder group, in consultation with
key EITI stakeholders, should agree and publish a
fully costed work plan, containing measurable
targets, and a timetable for implementation and
incorporating an assessment of capacity constraints.

6) The government is required to ensure that civil society is
fully, independently, actively and effectively engaged in the
process.

To retain EITI Compliance
Retaining Compliance
Requirements
21) Compliant countries must
maintain adherence to all the
requirements in order to retain
Compliant status.

7) The government is required to engage companies in the
implementation of the EITI
8) The government is required to remove any obstacles to the
implementation of the EITI
9) The multi-stakeholder group is required to agree a definition
of materiality and the reporting templates

10) The organization appointed to produce the EITI
reconciliation report must be perceived by the multi-stakeholder
group as credible, trustworthy and technically competent.

7

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. “EITI Rules, 2011 Edition, including the Validation Guide.” EITI International
Secretariat Oslo. Version: 1 November 2011.
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Before the end of the EITI Candidacy Period (cont’d)
11) The government is required to ensure that all relevant
companies and government entities report.
12) The government is required to ensure that company reports
are based on accounts audited to international standards
13) The government is required to ensure that government
reports are based on accounts audited to international standards
Disclosure Statements
14) Companies comprehensively disclose all material payments
in accordance with agreed reporting templates
15) Government agencies comprehensively disclose all material
revenues in accordance with the agreed reporting templates.
16) The multi-stakeholder group must be content that the
organization contracted to reconcile the company and
government figures did so satisfactorily
17) The reconciler must ensure that the EITI Report is
comprehensive, identifies all discrepancies, where possible
explains those discrepancies, and where necessary makes
recommendations for remedial actions to be taken.
Dissemination Requirements
18) The government and multi-stakeholder group must ensure
that the EITI Report is comprehensive and publicly accessible in
such a way to encourage that its findings contribute to public
debate.
Review and Validation Requirements
19) Oil, gas and mining companies must support EITI
implementation.
20) The government and multi-stakeholder group must take
steps to act on lessons learnt, address discrepancies and ensure
that EITI implementation is sustainable. Implementing countries
are required to submit Validation reports in accordance with the
deadlines established by the Board.

!
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